Congress encourage the Administration’s ongoing rulemaking efforts regarding “connected vehicles” to cover industrial ma­chinery, Internet of Things devices, appliances, and other con­nected devices produced by Chinese entities or including Chi­nese technologies that can be accessed, serviced, maintained, or updated remotely or through physical updates. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies)

Congress enact legislation prohibiting granting seats on boards of directors and information rights to China-based investors in strategic technology sectors. Allowing foreign investors to hold seats and observer seats on the boards of U.S. technology start­ups provides them with sensitive strategic information, which could be leveraged to gain competitive advantages. Prohibiting this practice would protect intellectual property and ensure that U.S. technological advances are not compromised. It would also reduce the risk of corporate espionage, safeguarding America’s leadership in emerging technologies. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies)

Congress establish that:

• The U.S. government will unilaterally or with key interna­tional partners seek to vertically integrate in the develop­ment and commercialization of quantum technology.
• Federal Government investments in quantum technology support every level of the technology development cycle and supply chain from basic research through product develop­ment and market deployment, including investments in in­termediate services capacity.
• The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in consultation with appropriate agencies and experts, develop a Quantum Technology Supply Chain Roadmap to ensure that the United States coordinates outbound investment, U.S. critical supply chain assessments, the activities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), and federally sup­ported research activities to ensure that the United States, along with key allies and partners, will lead in this critical technology and not advance Chinese capabilities and development.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition in Emerging Technologies)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Commerce, to develop assessment tools ca­pable of identifying the true origins of parts, components, and materials contained in products entering the United States to prevent tariff evasion and limit safety and security risks in light of the increasing complexity of global supply chains. (From Chapter 4: Unsafe and Unregulated Chinese Consumer Goods: Challenges in Enforcing Import Regulations and Laws)

Congress require that the U.S. Trade Representative, in consul­tation with the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Inter­national Trade Commission, and other entities, as appropriate, prepare a comprehensive report within 90 days on the operation of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement since its entry into force that provides data and information on:

• Chinese-affiliated investments in Mexico and Canada and specific information on their production of goods and how those goods may enter the U.S. market either as finished products or as components in other products;
• Trade flows of products produced in China to Mexico and Canada and how such trade flows have changed;
• Prices of products produced in China shipped to Mexico and Canada as well as products shipped through those countries to the United States and how those prices relate to the prices of such goods shipped directly into the U.S. market; and
• Trade enforcement actions by Mexico and Canada regarding Chinese-produced products (including those transshipped through third countries’ markets) and how such actions relate to U.S. trade enforcement actions.

(From Chapter 4: Unsafe and Unregulated Chinese Consumer Goods: Challenges in Enforcing Import Regulations and Laws)

Congress amend applicable laws to mandate that online mar­ketplaces clearly disclose on product listings for Chinese-made goods the name, physical address, and contact information for the manufacturer. The online marketplaces should also be re­quired to clearly display a warning label that the item is man­ufactured in a country that does not comply with U.S. consumer safety standards. (From Chapter 4: Unsafe and Unregulated Chinese Consumer Goods: Challenges in Enforcing Import Regulations and Laws)

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to investigate the reliability of safety testing certifications for consumer products and medical devices imported from China. (From Chapter 4: Unsafe and Unregulated Chinese Consumer Goods: Challenges in Enforcing Import Regulations and Laws)

Congress direct the Office of the Director of National Intelli­gence to produce and provide to the U.S. Department of the Treasury within six months a detailed study of Chinese pur­chases of Iranian oil over the span of the last five years. The study shall include analysis of China’s use of transshipment points and shell companies as methods to insulate itself from sanctions. Congress should further direct that within six months of receipt of the study, the Treasury Department must make a determination if sanctionable activity is occurring and report its findings to Congress. (From Chapter 5: China and the Middle East)

Congress direct the U.S. member on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council to use their voice and vote to re­quire China to abide by its treaty obligations under the IMO conventions, including by upholding safety regulations on the use of Automatic Identification System transponders. (From Chapter 5: China and the Middle East)

Congress direct relevant departments and agencies to expand their data collection and transparency initiatives into the vol­ume and types of investment flowing into China by taking the following actions:

• Amending the International Investment and Trade in Ser­vices Survey Act to require the Bureau of Economic Analysis within the U.S. Department of Commerce to publish more detailed sectoral breakdowns of U.S. direct investment in China on a nationality basis and the U.S. Department of the Treasury to publish annual sector breakdowns of U.S. portfo­lio investment in China on a nationality basis. The portfolio investment sectors should be more specific than those provid­ed by the Commerce Department for direct investment. Ad­ditionally, Congress should require the Treasury Department to publish quarterly updates—without sector breakdowns—of nationality-based portfolio investment in China.
• Requiring the U.S. Department of Commerce to produce a report on the feasibility and methodology for publishing na­tionality-based results for direct investment, where offshore tax havens and locales of incorporation would not be said to receive hundreds of billions of dollars and true destinations of the capital would be accurately identified.

(From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

Congress direct the Administration to impose sanctions on Chi­nese financial institutions that violate sanctions, including those that are proven to be working with or supporting the Russian military industrial base or facilitating purchases of Iranian oil. (From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

In light of the periodic and increasingly frequent removal of some of these materials from Chinese websites, Congress direct the executive branch to fund the creation and operation of a regularly updated, permanent data archive, in effect a series of snapshots of portions of the Chinese internet. In the past decade, foreign analysts have made use of open source Chi­nese-language materials to gain insight into various aspects of current policy as well as internal (but unclassified) discussions of future military, diplomatic, and economic strategy. Informa­tion would be stored in the permanent data archive, accessible to both government and private analysts. (From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

Congress consider legislation to set priorities and goals for U.S.-China economic relations. These policy priorities and goals should include:

• Updating existing trade and economic tools to ensure their timely application, utility, and effectiveness in countering China’s non-market economic policies;
• Limiting U.S. economic and security dependence on supply chains in critical and emerging products, technologies, and services provided by companies controlled, operating in, or subject to the influence of China;
• Enhancing the accountability of the executive branch to Con­gress and increasing the transparency of its actions to ensure coordinated governmental action and respect for Congress’s constitutional Article I, Section 8 authority;
• Prioritizing domestic production and employment while also recognizing the need, as appropriate, to coordinate and align policies with friends and allies;
• Acting to address production overcapacity fueled by Chinese policies and actions; and
• Advancing the resilience of the U.S. economy and ensuring its access to key inputs and technologies.

(From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

Congress pass legislation eliminating the ability of entities operating in U.S. Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs) to qualify for zero or lower tariffs on products imported from China or Chi­nese-affiliated or -invested entities into the FTZ and then re­exported. (From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

The relevant committees of Congress hold hearings to assess the desirability and feasibility of creating a trade defense co­alition with other like-minded countries to forestall the risk of a second China shock. Such a grouping would seek to align policies for responding to the recent acceleration in China’s ex­ports of subsidized, underpriced materials and manufactured goods. (From Chapter 6: Key Economic Strategies for Leveling the U.S.-China Playing Field)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to produce within 60 days a classified net assessment report on current People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Command, Control, Communi­cations, Computers Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnais­sance (C4ISR) capabilities and PLA electronic warfare (EW) ca­pabilities (including electronic attack and electronic protection capabilities). The report should examine U.S. counter-C4ISR and counter-EW capabilities, assess the resiliency of U.S. capa­bilities, identify counter-C4ISR and counter-EW gaps, and pro­vide a menu of procurement options to close the gaps. Not later than 60 days after its completion, the U.S. secretary of defense shall provide the report to the appropriate congressional com­mittees and brief them on its findings. (From Chapter 8: China’s Evolving Counter-Intervention Capabilities and the Role of Indo-Pacific Allies)

Congress direct the Office of the Director of National Intelli­gence, in conjunction with the U.S. Departments of Defense, Commerce, and the Treasury, and other relevant agencies, to conduct a comprehensive review of potential technological chokepoints across the People’s Republic of China military in­dustrial base and devise plans to apply controls, in conjunction with allies, to slow China’s military development. (From Chapter 8: China’s Evolving Counter-Intervention Capabilities and the Role of Indo-Pacific Allies)

Congress reinvigorate and recommit to space as an area of strategic competition, including by conducting a review of the commercial space industry to determine if there are regulatory updates that would ensure that the U.S. commercial space in­dustry is able to innovate as quickly as possible while maintain­ing safety as a top priority. (From Chapter 8: China’s Evolving Counter-Intervention Capabilities and the Role of Indo-Pacific Allies)

Congress amend the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 to include Taiwan on the list of “NATO Plus” recipients. (From Chapter 9: Taiwan)

Congress create a “Taiwan Allies Fund” that would provide foreign assistance only to countries that have an official diplo­matic relationship with Taiwan. No country could receive more than 15 percent of the appropriated funding each year. Coun­tries that no longer have a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan would immediately be ineligible for this funding. (From Chapter 9: Taiwan)

Congress require the Administration to produce a determina­tion whether reasonable grounds exist for concluding that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region should be designated as a Primary Money Laundering Concern (PMLC) jurisdiction under Section 311 of the Patriot Act due to its growing role as the central sanctions evasion hub and transshipment center for illicit finance and technology to Russia, Iran, and North Korea. (From Chapter 10: Hong Kong)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury, in coor­dination with the U.S. Departments of State and Commerce, to provide the relevant congressional committees a report as­sessing the ability of U.S. and foreign financial institutions operating in Hong Kong to identify and prevent transactions that facilitate the transfer of products, technology, and money to Russia, Iran, and other sanctioned countries and entities in violation of U.S. export controls, financial sanctions, and related rules. The report should:

• Evaluate the extent of Hong Kong’s role in facilitating the transfer of products and technologies to Russia, Iran, other adversary countries, and the Mainland, which are prohibited by export controls from being transferred to such countries;
• Evaluate Hong Kong’s role in facilitating trade and financial transactions that violate U.S. sanctions on Russia, Iran, and other countries and entities subject to U.S. financial sanctions;
• Examine whether Hong Kong’s National Security Law has limited the ability of financial institutions to adhere to global standards for anti-money laundering and know-your-custom­er procedures; and
• Describe the level of cooperation between Hong Kong and U.S. authorities in enforcing export controls and sanctions regimes.

(From Chapter 10: Hong Kong)

Congress pass legislation requiring the Judicial Conference of the United States to prepare an evaluation and guidance for U.S. courts and administrative personnel on the Chinese legal system and body of law for purposes of assisting courts in assessing recognition of Chinese judgments and change of venue, choice of law, and forum non conveniens inquiries. (From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 1: Rule by Law: China’s Increasingly Global Legal Reach)

Congress pass legislation to amend the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) to expand the definition of “covered transaction” to include “research contracts.” Under the expanded definition, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) should have the authority to review investments made by Chinese entities in the U.S. education system in the form of contracts. All parties to the transaction, including the foreign contracting organizations and U.S. institutions, should file a joint declaration to CFIUS ahead of their contract start date. Upon passage of this legislation, reporting requirements under section 117 of the Higher Education Act should be adjusted through regulation to include foreign gifts to U.S. universities and colleges, effectively transferring the administrative authority to receive and oversee the collection of foreign research contract reporting to CFIUS. (From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress amend the Lobbying Disclosure Act to require domestic associations, such as industry or trade associations, who employ an individual registered as a lobbyist to publicly disclose any donations or member contributions from entities based in China and other countries of concern, as well as their U.S. affiliates. (From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress support the establishment of a new entity under the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) to coordinate and disseminate news content internationally in Chinese, English, and other languages to promote fact-based information on China and counter Chinese Communist Party (CCP) global information manipulation. The entity could facilitate partnerships with international journalists and media and provide independent content, particularly where Chinese state and state-sponsored entities seek to discredit the United States and the values of liberal democracy and promote false narratives about China. This digital service will: 

• Curate and repackage the best of USAGM entities’ daily content to provide uncensored China-related news in Mandarin and English for countries around the world where China is making inroads promoting its values and attempting to discredit the United States; and 
• Engage audiences and partners through multiple platforms and multilateral means to promote responsible and fact-based journalism. 

(From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Trade and Development Agency, to prepare a public biennial assessment of the impact of China’s lending and other financial practices on Belt and Road Initiative participant countries and to recommend best practices for addressing the impacts of China’s activities through U.S. diplomatic and programmatic engagements. 

• The assessment should consider the impact of these practices on corruption and social stability within recipient countries, among other issues. 
• Based on the findings of the report, Congress request the U.S. Department of State, in coordination with the Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, and other relevant agencies, to work with the EU to develop a unified approach to addressing the impact of China’s activities under the Belt and Road Initiative in third countries. 

(From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress should consider legislative restrictions to address the national security and systemic risks raised by Chinese social media applications. (From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress should require the U.S. Department of State to establish as grounds for student visa revocation any instance where a foreign student surveils on behalf of or reports to any foreign-state intelligence, security, law enforcement, or political party authority the civil or political speech of any other student, or threatens to do so. The Department of State shall develop appropriate evidentiary sources and standards for revocation. (From Chapter 2: China’s Efforts to Subvert Norms and Exploit Open Societies, Section 2: Battling for Overseas Hearts and Minds: China’s United Front Propaganda Work)

Congress request a Government Accountability Office report assessing the reciprocal nature of information sharing, including access to databases, and scientific collaboration between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Such a report shall include information on access by U.S. academics and experts to ongoing research activities, projects, symposia, and other scientific and technology activities in China. It should also assess whether such collaboration and activities provide comparable information and value to that which is available to researchers from China at international conferences and venues or in the United States. (From Chapter 3: Potential Risks to China’s Future Economic Competitiveness, Section 1: China Educating and Training Its Next Generation Workforce)

To combat tariff evasion by Chinese exporters, Congress amend the procedures for investigating claims of trade remedy laws in the Enforce and Protect Act of 2015 to include merchandise subject to tariffs under the findings of the 2018 Section 301 investigation into China’s acts, policies, and practices of related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation. (From Chapter 3: Potential Risks to China’s Future Economic Competitiveness, Section 1: China Educating and Training Its Next Generation Workforce)

The Joint Economic Committee should consider resuming production of an annual unclassified report on the state of the Chinese economy and economic policy decisions of the Chinese Communist Party. The report would analyze open source and classified data and analysis, leveraging expertise from across the U.S. government, including analysts and economists from the relevant agencies of the intelligence community. (From Chapter 3: Potential Risks to China’s Future Economic Competitiveness, Section 1: China Educating and Training Its Next Generation Workforce)

Congress consider legislation requiring federal financial authorities, including the Federal Reserve, to seek specific information from bank and investment institutions regarding their exposure to, and involvement in, the People’s Republic of China. Such information shall include any wealth management products they offer within China and any Chinese investment vehicles they may sell to citizens of the United States directly or indirectly. (From Chapter 3: Potential Risks to China’s Future Economic Competitiveness, Section 1: China Educating and Training Its Next Generation Workforce)

Congress require the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State to provide to the appropriate committees of Congress within 180 days a classified briefing on China’s efforts to educate and train foreign military personnel. The briefing should address how China’s programs affect U.S. interests, including: (a) foreign military partners’ assessment of the value of China’s security assistance and training programs; and (b) whether the scale and offerings of U.S. military education and training programs are sufficient to maintain the United States’ status as a preferred partner. (From Chapter 4: China Seeking Military Influence and Advanced Capabilities, Section 1: China’s Relations with Foreign Militaries)

Congress require the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a report within 180 days that builds upon the restrictions on DOD’s contacts with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) outlined in section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 by detailing measures DOD is taking to mitigate the risk of the PLA gaining indirect knowledge of U.S. Armed Forces’ equipment and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures through interactions with the militaries of U.S. allies and partners. The report should identify any obstacles to ensuring sufficient partner awareness of these risks and to conducting the necessary follow-up and end-use monitoring to ensure compliance. (From Chapter 4: China Seeking Military Influence and Advanced Capabilities, Section 1: China’s Relations with Foreign Militaries)

Congress hold hearings to evaluate the potential for establishing a single export licensing system. Such a system would integrate the Commerce Control List, the dual-use technology licensing system managed by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and the U.S. Munitions List, the armaments licensing system managed by the U.S. Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls. In evaluating a single licensing system, Congress should consider: 

• Whether a single licensing system could improve the enforcement of export controls targeting specific end users, particularly those in jurisdictions with poor transparency into corporate ownership and commercial affiliations, such as China; 
• The potential commercial impact of combining the licensing systems, including how to reduce the compliance burden on industry without compromising national security; 
• Which technologies to include in a combined system and how to integrate appropriate technical expertise to scope evolving controls on dual-use emerging and foundational technologies; 
• Where such a system should be housed within the U.S. government and how to establish effective coordination between different agency stakeholders; and
• How to provide the Department of State and other relevant agencies with appropriate information and authorities to advocate for multilateral export controls that advance U.S. security, foreign policy, and economic competitiveness. 

(From Chapter 4: China Seeking Military Influence and Advanced Capabilities, Section 2: Weapons, Technology, and Export Controls)

Congress direct the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the Development Finance Corporation, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to report on how they are incorporating promotion of U.S.-supported technical standards into U.S.-funded development projects or technical assistance provided abroad. (From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 1: Europe-China Relations; Convergence and Divergence in Transatlantic Cooperation)

Congress direct the Administration to establish a secure electric vehicle (EV) and new energy vehicle (NEV) supply chain by considering legislation that would foster U.S.-EU-UK coordination on: 

• Raising or maintaining tariffs on Chinese EV, NEV, and related inputs and technology; and 
• Promoting supply chain diversification and resilience in the EV and NEV markets.

(From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 1: Europe-China Relations; Convergence and Divergence in Transatlantic Cooperation)

Congress should pass legislation establishing a joint “center of excellence” operated by the United States and Taiwan to uncover, analyze, and counter China’s disinformation and offensive cyber operations against Taiwan. This center could be modeled on the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and foster cooperation, capabilities, and information sharing on disinformation and cybersecurity through education, training, and research. (From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 2: Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State and relevant agencies to produce an unclassified report examining the expected economic impact of a People’s Liberation Army blockade and/or quarantine of Taiwan. The report should seek to assess the following under each scenario: (1) the impact on global trade and output on timelines up to one year; (2) the top ten sectors that will be most disrupted by a sustained blockade; and (3) the expected impact on the domestic economies of each G7 country from such action. (From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 2: Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to include in the annual report required by the Hong Kong Autonomy Act information on the Hong Kong government’s restriction of émigrés’ access to their financial accounts in the territory, including from the government-run Mandatory Provident Fund (MPF) pension scheme. Based on the findings of the report, the Administration should impose sanctions, as authorized under the 2020 Hong Kong Autonomy Act, on individuals involved in limiting freedom of emigration. Congress may consider further steps to prevent U.S.-based financial institutions involved in managing the funds of Hong Kongers from aiding in violating freedom of emigration by withholding pension funds from their rightful owners at the behest of Hong Kong’s government. (From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 3: Hong Kong)

Congress amend the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to add to the contents of the required annual report an evaluation of limitations on Hong Kong’s judicial independence. Specifically, the evaluation should assess whether the chief executive or any other body acting on behalf of China’s government has exercised undue influence over the Hong Kong judicial system in ways that violate the right to a fair and independent trial as guaranteed under the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Based on the findings of the report, Congress may impose sanctions, as authorized under the 2020 Hong Kong Autonomy Act, on individuals involved with the Hong Kong judiciary serving in Hong Kong, including foreign national judges that serve on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. (From Chapter 5: Changing Relations with Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, Section 3: Hong Kong)

Congress pass legislation creating a new Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) (to replace the Open Source Center closed in 2015) that will translate and maintain a publicly available collection of important open source material from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other countries of strategic interest. This legislation should require existing FFRDCs to provide to this new entity a copy of all open source Chinese-language materials collected or used in any government-sponsored analytical or related projects on an ongoing basis. (From Chapter 1: CCP Decision-Making and Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Authority)

Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence to produce an unclassified directory of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) senior members and organizations, similar to the “Directory of PRC Military Personalities” produced and updated by the U.S. Department of Defense.

• The directory should be updated on an annual basis and consist of an unclassified public report on the CCP, including the Party’s organizational structure (including organizations affiliated with the United Front Work Department) and profiles of leaders and organizations at least to the level that the CCP defines as “senior cadre.”
• The contents of each year’s directory should be retained in the form of an unclassified, publicly available, searchable database of CCP members and organizations.

(From Chapter 1: CCP Decision-Making and Xi Jinping’s Centralization of Authority)

Congress consider legislation providing the authority to impose retaliatory trade measures against China in support of an ally or partner subject to Chinese economic coercion. Such legislation shall authorize coordinated trade action with U.S. allies and partners. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct that any entity subject to national security restrictions or sanctions by a U.S. department or agency, including but not limited to the Entity List, should be denied access to the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), the Automated Clearing House (ACH), and the Federal Reserve’s funds transfer system (Fedwire). (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce to provide regular (semiannual) reports on its enforcement of the foreign direct product rules and its approval of export license applications for entities seeking to export to China items produced from technology or software controlled for national security reasons. Such a report shall not identify U.S. exporters, but it shall include:

• The number of licenses granted;
• The number of licenses granted per export destination;
• Item classifications for such licenses;
• The value of such exports; and
• The rationale for granting the licenses.

(From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to mandate that any applicant for a U.S. patent that has received support under a program administered directly or indirectly by the Chinese government provide the same disclosures that recipients of U.S. federal support must provide. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop a process to identify and self-initiate antidumping and countervailing duty petitions covering products from China. In developing the methodology to support such a process, the department shall utilize existing government data and develop new data collection efforts prioritizing the identification of products injuring or threatening to injure small- and medium-sized enterprises or industries facing long-term harm from Chinese industrial overcapacity. The department shall also develop the capabilities for the U.S. government to identify and pursue self-initiation of circumvention, evasion, and transshipment enforcement cases to address products originating from China. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce to update its methodology in determining antidumping duty rates for products from China to net out the subsidy or dumping impact of Chinese-sourced inputs utilized in identifying relevant third-country proxy rates to determine dumping margins. This approach should allow for the adjustment of rates used to identify an appropriate proxy for market-based producers where China’s impact on such rates may skew the true market equivalent value of such products to determine dumping margins. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress consider legislation that would address the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to undermine U.S. intellectual property protections through its use of antisuit injunctions. In considering such legislation, Congress should seek to ensure the integrity of U.S. patent laws and the strength of our nation’s patent system and its support for U.S. innovation by protecting patent rights and the sovereignty of U.S. courts and the U.S. adjudicatory system. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

In enacting legislation subsidizing research or production, Congress should evaluate whether China can legally gain access to that research or to the knowledge and equipment needed to produce that good to prevent the United States from indirectly subsidizing or supporting Chinese competitors. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to monitor and publicly identify in an annual report the industries wherein China’s subsidies, including state monopolization and evergreen loans, pose the greatest risk to U.S. production and employment. A rebuttable presumption of guilt in antidumping and countervailing duty processes shall result from the findings of this report. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Challenging China’s Trade Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to produce a classified report on the feasibility of and the military requirements for an effective blockade of energy shipments bound for China in the event of military conflict involving China. The report should place particular attention on the Strait of Malacca and the feasibility of operationalizing a blockade of shipping bound for China intending to transit that waterway. The report should also consider the extent to which China may be able to satisfy its energy needs during a crisis or conflict through stockpiles, by rationing supplies, and by relying on overland shipments through current and planned cross-border oil and gas pipelines. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China's Energy Plans and Practices)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Energy to produce an annual report detailing the extent to which U.S. supply chains for key energy technologies, components, and materials are subject to Chinese control or manipulation. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Energy Plans and Practices)

In enacting legislation subsidizing reshoring or existing production in the United States, Congress should evaluate whether the subsidies may lead to additional dependence on supply chains running through or relying on China to serve that production. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

Congress enact legislation requiring suppliers to the U.S. government in “critical” sectors, as defined by Congress, to confidentially disclose all tiers of their contractors for the purpose of identifying U.S. supply chain dependencies on China. If suppliers are unable to do this within three years and each year thereafter, they are ineligible to receive government contracts. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

Congress direct each federal agency administering Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) or Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs to develop a due diligence program to ensure the supply chain integrity of participating U.S. small businesses and decrease their dependencies on Chinese suppliers. The program should also include resources for participating businesses to prevent investments from Chinese firms, particularly those involved in China’s Military-Civil Fusion program, that target emerging technologies and innovations valuable to the U.S. Department of Defense and other SBIR or STTR sponsoring agencies. 

• The due diligence program of each SBIR or STTR administering agency should provide financial and technical assistance to U.S. small businesses for up to three years for the purposes of supporting sustained procurement opportunities for the government and improving small businesses’ internal capacity for federal engagement. Technical assistance may include establishing procedures for identifying foreign entities of concern within small businesses supply chains. 

(From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

Congress direct the Administration to release a comprehensive public report on the utilization of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) procurement of inputs, components, and products from China:

• By the U.S. Department of Defense and contractors in major weapons systems; in Munitions List items; and in Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) items;
• In critical infrastructure as identified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and
• In critical supply chains and sectors as identified in U.S. government agency reports submitted per section 4 of Executive Order 14017 on “America’s Supply Chains.”
• Such a report shall identify the specific items that were purchased, overall quantities, and, where applicable, the value of the contracts in aggregate by item.

(From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

Congress direct the Administration to provide a public semiannual report on the volume of products detained, excluded, or seized for violations of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and related enforcement activities. This report should detail product sector, product quantity, and whether the shipment was stopped directly or indirectly containing any production linked to Uyghur forced labor. This report shall also detail any and all existing loopholes in U.S. trade law and trade enforcement mechanisms that inhibit the ability of relevant U.S. government agencies to trace mined, manufactured, or procured goods made using Uyghur forced labor. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

To ensure the U.S. government is able to assess its reliance on foreign sources, Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce to calculate U.S. import dependence at the product level across all industries, combining domestic production data (North American Industry Classification System [NAICS] codes) with U.S. export and import data (HTS [Harmonized Tariff Schedule] codes) in order to obtain a clearer picture of the United States’ import dependence and provide the results in a publicly accessible database. This database should be consistently updated and should for each industry and product category tabulate dependence on China or any major source location that is known to use components and materials from China. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Resilience)

Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to create an updateable list of Chinese firms operating in critical sectors and found to have benefited from coercive intellectual property transfer, including theft. Such a list would enable the U.S. Department of the Treasury to ban investment in and the U.S. Department of Commerce to deny export licenses to these firms and related parties for a rolling period of five years to prevent Chinese beneficiaries from further gaining from U.S. intellectual property loss. If additional authorities are needed, such requests should be made to Congress on an expedited basis. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to catalog Chinese-sourced surveillance equipment, first responder communication systems, and smart cities systems used by state and local governments. The Department of Homeland Security shall further identify:

• Levels of risk from these systems as a result of foreign interference or malicious cyber activity;
• Plans to remove and replace such equipment to protect U.S. interests; and
• The necessary resources to implement these plans.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States)

Congress pass legislation codifying the concept of “systemically important critical infrastructure” (SICI) and requiring SICI-designated entities, defense contractors, and recipients of federal funding for research and development of sensitive and emerging technologies to undertake enhanced hardening and mitigation efforts against cyberattacks. These efforts shall follow cybersecurity standards and guidance as determined by the U.S. Department of Defense and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. Congress should provide appropriate legal liability “safe harbor” provisions to compliant SICI operators and appropriate support as necessary for SICI-designated small- and medium-sized companies to address the cost of compliance. Such legislation would also require that cybersecurity risk mitigation plans be a condition for the Small Business Administration (SBA) to award grants such as those under the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. As part of the regular audit process, SBA and any relevant agencies should ensure implementation of these plans and require certification of compliance. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States)

Congress direct the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit investment in and other financial transactions with any Chinese entities that have been involved in cyber-enabled intelligence collection or theft of intellectual property sponsored by the People’s Republic of China against U.S.-based persons or organizations under authorities pursuant to Executive Order 13694 on “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities” (amended as EO 13757), including any individuals, research institutes, universities, and companies that have been affiliated with Chinese state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) groups or served as contractors for China’s Ministry of State Security or People’s Liberation Army. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Cyber Capabilities: Warfare, Espionage, and Implications for the United States)

Congress direct the U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to submit a strategy on U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean region with considerations for competition with China in the region, including:

• Enhancing development and U.S. economic activity in the region;
• Defending freedom of navigation;
• Supporting and facilitating regional allies and partners in addressing security challenges in the region; and
• Promoting cooperation with U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Australia, and major defense partners, including India, and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and France, to support a rules-based order in the region.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 3: China’s Activities and Influence in South and Central Asia)

Congress direct the Administration to submit a strategy on U.S. interests in Central Asia with considerations for significant changing circumstances in the region, including:

• Russia’s diminishing presence as a result of its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine;
• The Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan; and
• China’s growing influence on members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization through promoting Chinese governance concepts, including antiterrorism and law enforcement norms aimed at suppressing political opposition and cyber sovereignty and information security standards that empower authoritarian regimes to restrict the free flow of information.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 3: China’s Activities and Influence in South and Central Asia)

Congress direct the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Development Finance Corporation, and other relevant agencies to make available training to relevant officials in South and Central Asia in assessing and mitigating the risks of China’s investment and lending in the regions. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security and Foreign Affairs, Section 3: China’s Activities and Influence in South and Central Asia)

Congress direct the Administration to extend the deferral of enforced departure of qualifying Hong Kong citizens in the United States, which would otherwise end in February of 2023. The U.S. Departments of State and Homeland Security shall submit a plan to Congress within 180 days addressing the long-term status and treatment of Hong Kong citizens in the United States. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong) 

Congress consider legislation requiring U.S. entities with data operations in Hong Kong to submit an annual report on any requests or attempts to access such data from the Hong Kong government or Chinese authorities. This report will also detail the nature of any request or attempt to access and the U.S. entity’s compliance. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong)

Congress direct the U.S. Secretary of State to include a detailed list of all websites blocked in Hong Kong pursuant to its annual report requirements under the Hong Kong Policy Act to document limitations to freedom of information. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong)

Congress hold hearings including Administration witnesses to explore the advisability of forming an economic defense coalition with allies and partners. The object of such a coalition would be to provide mutual support in the event of economic coercion by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) against a coalition member. Such support could include:

• Commitments not to seek, at the expense of the coerced party, market share created by China’s action;
• Formal complaints to the World Trade Organization (WTO);
• Assistance to the coerced party to reduce its incentive to comply with Chinese demands; and
• Imposition of retaliatory measures against China in support of the coerced party.

(From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 1: The Chinese Communist Party’s Ambitions at Its Centennial)

Congress recognize that Chinese economic, diplomatic, and security initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean are robust and growing and demand a comprehensive response. Steps Congress should consider include:

• Strengthening U.S. competitiveness in building out Latin American and Caribbean infrastructure through the expansion of funding mechanisms, including but not limited to low-interest loans from U.S. lending institutions to U.S. companies willing to invest in targeted critical infrastructure projects in high-priority Latin American and Caribbean countries; 
• Supporting the deployment of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) vaccines in Latin American and Caribbean countries, including by requiring a public report issued by the U.S. Department of State every six months outlining vaccine deployment to countries in the region; and
• Expanding educational exchanges between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, including by expanding partnership agreements between U.S. universities and higher education institutions in Latin American and Caribbean countries.

(From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean)

Congress support Latin American and Caribbean countries in the establishment of inbound foreign investment review processes for sectors critical to national security and economic security by doing the following:

• Expanding the support given by the U.S. government to governments of U.S. allied and partner countries to establish inbound foreign investment review processes similar to those of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) established in the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act within Title XVII of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019. Support for these governments will expand upon existing information exchange processes to include provision of technical assistance and personnel training.
• Requiring the U.S. Department of State, in conjunction with CFIUS, to provide an annual report to Congress for three consecutive years after enactment of this provision. The report shall outline the progress and outcomes of its engagement with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish their own inbound foreign investment review processes.

(From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean)

Congress require the director of national intelligence, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, to produce an unclassified report, including a classified annex, documenting Chinese investment in port infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere and detailing any known Chinese interest in establishing a military presence at or near these ports. The report should include an assessment of China’s current and potential future ability to leverage commercial ports for military purposes and the implications for the United States. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean)

Congress enact legislation directing the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Trade and Development Agency, Millennium Challenge Corporation, and other executive agencies responsible for disbursing foreign aid and development assistance to require within all aid-related applications mandatory disclosures on debt the applicant may owe to Chinese entities, including loan amounts, duration, rates, and contractual provisions. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean)

Congress enact legislation requiring the U.S. government authorities identified in the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act within section 3544 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 to create a partnership with coastal Latin American states, similar to the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative and the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. This partnership would assist coastal Latin American states in maritime domain awareness, with a particular focus on increasing partner countries’ capacity to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing by Chinese vessels in the region. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 2: China’s Influence in Latin America and the Caribbean)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Energy, in coordination with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and other relevant agencies, to produce a report and research plan outlining a project for the collection and sequencing of nonhuman genomic data, analogous to the Human Genome Project. Such a plan shall include:

• A description of the types of nonhuman genomic data to be collected and sequenced;
• An explanation of research value and commercial applications from collecting and sequencing such data;
• The designation of an existing Department of Energy National Laboratory to coordinate the project and award grants to U.S. universities and private companies in furtherance of the project’s goals;
• A description of ethical considerations and processes for stakeholder engagement; and
• Articulation of the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s role to:
  • Codify technical standards related to the project;
  • Share and protect data collected during the project; and
  • Engage with the public and international partners on the project’s findings.

(From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic and Technological Ambitions: Synthetic Biology, New Mobility, Cloud Computing, and Digital Currency)

Congress direct the National Institute of Standards and Technology, in coordination with the National Institutes of Health, the U.S. Patent and Trade Office, the Department of Energy, and the Department of State, to establish a model framework for the protection, collection, and commercialization of nonhuman genomic data. The framework should seek to establish principles on intellectual property rights for the countries of origin of genomic data. This framework should also be used in international outreach regarding protection of national biotechnology assets and Chinese predatory collection of data. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: The Chinese Communist Party's Economic and Technological Ambitions: Synthetic Biology, New Mobility, Cloud Computing, and Digital Currency)

Congress request a report from the Administration regarding data servicing operations owned by Chinese firms. Such a report shall include:

• Whether such firms are operating in the United States, what laws and regulations may apply to such operations and services, and what cloud computing services are offered or provided to U.S. persons;
• Whether Chinese cloud computing providers are engaged in any joint ventures or servicing arrangements with U.S. firms and the nature of such operations;
• Whether consumers of these services have access to prominently identified information regarding the ownership of such cloud computing services;
• Whether U.S. firms can operate freely in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and what, if any, restrictions might apply to their services and operations;
• Where Chinese-owned firms may be providing equipment or services for the provision of cloud computing support in third-country markets and whether the market share of Chinese-owned firms in those markets may limit, in any way, the ability of U.S.-owned firms to operate independently of such operations; and
• What support the Chinese government may be providing to cloud computing firms in terms of equipment and services that may act as a subsidy for such operations.

(From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic and Technological Ambitions: Synthetic Biology, New Mobility, Cloud Computing, and Digital Currency)

Congress consider legislation requiring that the U.S. Department of Transportation, in consultation with the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Defense, and law enforcement authorities, develop regulations limiting access for Chinese-owned firms developing autonomous vehicle capabilities to protect U.S. national and economic security interests. In preparing such regulations, the authorities should consider the extent to which the Chinese government limits access of U.S. firms for similar uses. Specific attention should be given to data collection activities that may advance the interests of the Chinese military or intelligence agencies. In addition, such legislation shall address any need to protect the data utilized and collected by autonomous vehicles produced and/or serviced by Chinese-owned firms. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic and Technological Ambitions: Synthetic Biology, New Mobility, Cloud Computing, and Digital Currency)

The committees of relevant jurisdiction in the House and Senate investigate and hold hearings with a view toward considering legislation on the operations of China’s Blockchain-Based Service Network, with particular attention to its operations in the United States and participation of U.S. companies in building out the network. Such investigation should look at the goals of the network in developing blockchain infrastructure and whether the involvement of the Chinese government and Chinese state-owned entities may put at risk any U.S. economic and national security interests. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: The Chinese Communist Party’s Economic and Technological Ambitions: Synthetic Biology, New Mobility, Cloud Computing, and Digital Currency)

Congress direct the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce to amend its surveys of U.S. multinational enterprise activity in China to report on the presence and actions of CCP committees in the foreign affiliates of U.S. firms operating in China. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: The Chinese Government’s Evolving Control of the Nonstate Sector)

Congress pass legislation that defines categories of Chinese persons, Chinese entities, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-related persons and entities subject to full blocking sanctions and inclusion on the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s SDN list due to actions that harm the vital national interest or the national security of the United States or that constitute gross human rights violations. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S.-China Financial Connectivity and Risks to U.S. National Security)

Congress direct the Administration to conduct an interagency review of any Chinese universities that maintain research or training arrangements with China’s nuclear weapons research institutes, such as the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics and the Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology. The review should be led by the U.S. Department of Energy and include the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and Defense; the Intelligence Community; and other federal departments and agencies as appropriate. The review would:

• Assess the impact of such cooperation on China’s nuclear weapons programs and capabilities;
• Assess whether current U.S. export controls adequately address risks from the transfer and exchange of information and technologies with applications to nuclear research, particularly by researchers and departments in relevant academic disciplines at U.S. universities to these Chinese universities;
• Identify Chinese universities and research institutes that should be added to the Entity List, based on the risks posed by their cooperation with the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics, Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology, and other Chinese institutions involved in nuclear weapons development, as appropriate;
• Identify Chinese universities and research institutes that merit a presumption of denial for all export licenses involving items covered by the Export Administration Regulations; and
• Develop and maintain a list of all academic partnerships in fields with applications to nuclear weapons development entered into between Chinese universities and U.S. universities that receive federal funding for the purpose of determining whether these activities are subject to export controls.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security, Politics, and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving beyond a Minimal Deterrent)

Congress enact legislation creating an independent bipartisan commission, similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review commissions authorized in the past, to assess the Nuclear Posture Review and advise Congress about whether the current U.S. nuclear posture is sufficient to maintain deterrence against the expanding Chinese and Russian nuclear forces. The Commission should:

• Determine how Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities have changed between 2010 and 2022;
• Evaluate whether the current number of U.S.-deployed strategic weapons is sufficient to deter both Russia and China over the next 20 years; and
• Identify any further changes required to U.S. force posture, doctrine, and missile defense.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security, Politics, and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving beyond a Minimal Deterrent) 

Congress authorize funding for a comprehensive diplomatic strategy on nuclear deterrence and arms control. This comprehensive program would include:

• Intelligence diplomacy with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and in Europe to inform them of developments in China’s nuclear forces;
• Dialogue to convince these allies and partners to pressure Beijing diplomatically to enter into arms control talks and to explore these partners’ willingness to host U.S. intermediate-range forces and other U.S. assets; and
• Continued efforts to engage both Russia and China in trilateral arms control talks, including by continuing efforts with Russia to persuade China to enter into arms control discussions.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Security, Politics, and Foreign Affairs, Section 2: China’s Nuclear Forces: Moving beyond a Minimal Deterrent) 

Congress enhance Taiwan’s ability to purchase U.S. defense articles and accelerate the process for their sale and delivery to Taiwan by:

• Authorizing and appropriating on a multiyear basis Foreign Military Financing Program funds for Taiwan to purchase defense articles from the United States and allowing Taiwan to use Foreign Military Financing funds to purchase arms through direct commercial contracts;
• Amending the Foreign Assistance Act to make Taiwan eligible to receive priority delivery of U.S. excess defense articles; and
• Directing the Administration to use the Special Defense Acquisition Fund to reduce defense procurement lead times for arms sales to Taiwan by pre-stocking defense articles needed to maintain cross-Strait deterrence.

(From Chapter 4: A Dangerous Period for Cross-Strait Deterrence: Chinese Military Capabilities and Decision-Making for a War over Taiwan)

Congress amend the Hong Kong Autonomy Act to add to the contents of the annual report required by the act a determination of whether the Beijing-controlled Government of Hong Kong has violated freedom of emigration from Hong Kong. The report should assess whether the Government of Hong Kong has:

• Denied Hong Kong residents’ right or opportunity to emigrate;
• Imposed more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or
• Made emigration contingent on receiving official approval that is not practicably possible to obtain or is otherwise obstructed by authorities.

(From Chapter 5: Hong Kong’s Government Embraces Authoritarianism)

Congress amend section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 to require the U.S. Trade Representative to include an assessment of Hong Kong’s treatment as a separate customs territory in its annual report on China’s compliance with commitments made in connection with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). This additional section of the report should consider: 

• Hong Kong’s compliance to its commitments under the WTO;
• Whether mainland Chinese entities operating in Hong Kong are using the Special Administrative Region’s status as a transshipment hub to circumvent U.S. duties on China;
• Whether Hong Kong “possesses full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations” and if the United States should continue to recognize Hong Kong’s rights as a separate customs territory under the WTO pursuant to section 201 of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992; and
• Whether the United States should apply tariffs and all other trade treatment to Hong Kong equivalent to that of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The U.S. Trade Representative should consult the secretary of state’s determination of Hong Kong’s autonomy when making this recommendation to the president.

(From Chapter 5: Hong Kong’s Government Embraces Authoritarianism) 

Congress, in consideration of the plight of prodemocracy activists from the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, should encourage the secretary of homeland security to exercise their authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act on the basis of both a “compelling emergency” and “urgent humanitarian reason[s]” to parole into the United States aliens who are residents of Hong Kong and who are applying for admission to the United States. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong’s Government Embraces Authoritarianism)

Congress require the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Commerce to collect information from U.S. companies operating in Hong Kong concerning requests from the Government of Hong Kong for content takedowns, access to data, and law enforcement assistance. The departments shall report their findings to Congress every 180 days specifying:

• The number of requests fulfilled and by which companies;
• Where such requests involved user data; and
• Which local laws the requests invoked.

(From Chapter 5: Hong Kong’s Government Embraces Authoritarianism) 

Congress direct the Department of Justice to require media outlets operating in the United States that are majority owned by the Government of the PRC or the Government of Hong Kong to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Congress should also direct the Department of State to determine whether such outlets qualify as a foreign mission of the PRC. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong’s Government Embraces Authoritarianism) 

Congress require the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, within 180 days, to prepare a report on China’s use of rules of origin intended to benefit countries eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to ensure AGOA countries obtain the benefit of favorable trade policies and China is not using them to circumvent U.S. trade policies. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Global Competition, Section 3: China’s Strategic Aims in Africa)

Congress request that the Administration prepare a report on the research and development activities of the affiliates of U.S. multinational enterprises operating in China and the implications of such activities for U.S. production, employment, and the economy. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Vulnerabilities in China’s Financial System and Risks for the United States)

Congress enact legislation to require ancestry and health testing services to (1) require explicit consent from customers to provide, sell, lease, or rent to any party individual data that is aggregated for the purposes of research; and (2) disclose to customers any parent company or subsidiary relationship. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: U.S.-China Links in Healthcare and Biotechnology)

Congress establish a new U.S. national laboratory focusing on biotechnology or designate an existing U.S. national laboratory to focus on biotechnology. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: U.S.-China Links in Healthcare and Biotechnology)

Congress amend the TAIPEI Act to provide that the United States, as a member of any international organization, should oppose any attempts by China to resolve Taiwan’s status by distorting the language, policies, or procedures of the organization. (From Chapter 4: Taiwan)

Congress evaluate the opportunity to strengthen economic relations with Taiwan in key sectors where there are unique reciprocal opportunities, with technology as the initial sector for evaluation. (From Chapter 4: Taiwan)

Congress encourage the Administration to include Taiwan in multilateral efforts to coordinate and strengthen supply chain cooperation and security. This could be done through the expansion of Global Cooperation and Training Framework programming or a new multilateral arrangement with likeminded democracies. This multilateral engagement should focus on securing critical inputs and assuring supply chain resilience in strategic industries critical to economic competitiveness and national security, including information and communications technology, integrated circuits, and electronic components. (From Chapter 4: Taiwan)

Congress consider legislation extending political asylum to res- idents of Hong Kong born on or after June 30, 1997, who currently cannot apply for a second form of identification beyond a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong)

Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to produce a report within 90 days assessing the risk of mainland China using Hong Kong to evade or circumvent Section 301 trade enforcement actions or other U.S. trade remedies. (From Chapter 5: Hong Kong)

Congress provide resources for programs that support independent media and the free flow of information to prioritize Indo-Pacific countries in their efforts to counter China’s influence and propaganda efforts. (From Chapter 2: Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges)

Congress require the U.S. Department of the Treasury to prepare a report to Congress on the operation of China’s Cross-Border International Payment System. As part of such a report, the department shall include information on the extent to which the Cross-Border International Payment System could be used to bypass international sanctions regimes. (From Chapter 2: Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges)

Congress enact legislation requiring the collection of data on U.S.-China economic relations. This legislation would: 

• Direct U.S. economic statistics-producing agencies, including the U.S. Census Bureau, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S. International Trade Commission, to review methodologies for collecting and publishing not only gross trade flows data, but also detailed supply chain data to better document the country of origin for components of each imported good before it reaches U.S. consumers. 
• Direct the U.S. Census Bureau to restart data releases in its Current Industrial Reports at the ten-digit industry level. 
• Direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to coordinate with the U.S. Census Bureau to match U.S. firm-level data with their U.S. employees’ data. 

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 1: U.S.-China Commercial Relations)

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment on the risks posed by Beijing’s efforts to co-opt foreign researchers or students at U.S. universities to unlawfully appropriate research and other knowledge for the benefit of the government, companies, or interests of the People’s Republic of China. This report should: 

• Include the number of foreign students and researchers from China studying in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics fields; past and current affiliations; primary areas of research; duration of stay in the United States; and subsequent employment; 
• Identify whether federally funded university research related to emerging technologies may have been unlawfully appropriated by individuals acting on behalf of Chinese entities; and 
• Evaluate the efficacy and ability of the U.S. Department of State’s visa screening mechanism to mitigate the risk of inappropriate technology transfer to China, including but not limited to: assessing the ability of that process to identify students, researchers, and research entities, through a visa disclosure requirement, that are receiving funding from the government of China or an intermediary entity acting in support of China’s government.

(From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 2: Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials, and New Energy)

Congress amend Internal Revenue Code Section 41 to extend the research and development tax credit to initial stages of deployment for new products, processes, computer software, techniques, formulae, or inventions that increase the production of final and intermediary goods manufactured primarily in the United States. The tax credit should also extend to precompetitive commercial development of basic and applied research performed in the United States, particularly in industrial sectors where the People’s Republic of China threatens the technological leadership of the United States. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 2: Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials, and New Energy)

Congress direct the U.S. Geological Survey, in coordination with the U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of the Interior, and U.S. International Trade Commission to develop and maintain a risk assessment framework that identifies materials used in manufacturing industries critical to both national security and commercial vitality. Such a framework should provide an early warning mechanism for any threats to the U.S. supply of these critical materials, including an increasing concentration of extraction and processing by another country or entity and acquisition of significant mining and processing facilities; increasing export restrictions by another country; large gaps between domestic prices for these materials in another country versus prices on international markets; sharp increases or volatility in price; and substantial control in supply of minerals used within the same industry or related minerals that serve as substitutes by another country. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 2: Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials, and New Energy)

Congress direct the National Science Foundation, in coordination with other agencies, to conduct a study on the impact of the activities of Chinese government, state-sponsored organizations, or entities affiliated or supported by the state in international bodies engaged in developing and setting standards for emerging technologies. The study should examine whether standards are being designed to promote Chinese government interests to the exclusion of other participants. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 2: Emerging Technologies and Military-Civil Fusion: Artificial Intelligence, New Materials, and New Energy)

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to update its 2016 report, Drug Safety: FDA Has Improved Its Foreign Drug Inspection Program, but Needs to Assess the Effectiveness and Staffing of Its Foreign Offices. The updated report should focus on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s ability to conduct inspections of Chinese drug manufacturing facilities. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 3: Growing U.S. Reliance on China’s Biotech and Pharmaceutical Products)

Congress consider legislation requiring generic drug manufacturers that sell medicines to the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs to disclose which essential drugs are at risk of shortage or supply disruption because the relevant products, active pharmaceutical ingredients, chemical intermediates, and raw materials contained in them are sourced from China. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 3: Growing U.S. Reliance on China’s Biotech and Pharmaceutical Products)

Congress enact legislation requiring drug companies to list active pharmaceutical ingredients and their countries of origin on labels of imported and domestically produced finished drug products. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 3: Growing U.S. Reliance on China’s Biotech and Pharmaceutical Products)

Congress enact legislation creating a risk-based system making importers of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and finished products liable for any health risks incurred by consumers in the event the product is proven unsafe due to contamination, mislabeling, or other defects. Special attention should be paid to finished drug products imported from China or containing APIs sourced from China. (From Chapter 3: U.S.-China Competition, Section 3: Growing U.S. Reliance on China’s Biotech and Pharmaceutical Products)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to incorporate an assessment in its Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China of China’s progress toward achieving its goal to build a “world-class” military. The report should also include an explanation of how the department defines this term. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 1: Beijing’s “World-Class” Military Goal)

Congress direct a classified assessment identifying where China has undertaken activities that may be aimed at establishing a military presence, operating location, or storage depot. This assessment would include Chinese state-owned enterprises or other commercial interests tied to the Chinese government investing in strategic assets, such as ports and airfields, and should suggest options that could be employed to dissuade host countries from agreeing to host a Chinese military presence. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 1: Beijing’s “World-Class” Military Goal)

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of the U.S. government’s ability to hire and retain Chinese-language-capable employees. The study would examine U.S. government agencies’ processes for determining Chinese-language-designated positions and hiring and clearing employees, assess the extent to which the agencies are meeting their language proficiency requirements for these positions, measure the effects of language proficiency and gaps on the agencies’ ability to perform their missions, and develop recommendations to address identified shortfalls. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 1: Beijing’s “World-Class” Military Goal)

Congress direct the Office of the Director for National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate of China’s and Russia’s approaches to competition with the United States and revision of the international order. The assessment would consider the influence of both countries’ ideologies on their foreign policies, including areas both of overlap and of divergence; potential “wedge issues” the United States might exploit; and the implications for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of a two-front conflict involving both China and Russia. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 2: An Uneasy Entente: China-Russia Relations in a New Era of Strategic Competition with the United States)

Members of Congress promote U.S. interests in the Arctic by participating in congressional delegations to Arctic Council member states and attending the biennial Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region to discuss economic and security concerns regarding China and Russia. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 2: An Uneasy Entente: China-Russia Relations in a New Era of Strategic Competition with the United States)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to take the following steps to ensure it is prepared to counter China’s and Russia’s destabilizing approaches to military operations in space: 

• Ensure U.S. Space Command and any future space-oriented service are responsible for protecting freedom of navigation and keeping lines of communication open, safe, and secure in the space domain, as the U.S. Navy does for U.S. interests in the maritime commons. 
• Strengthen the credibility of U.S. deterrence in space by fully integrating the space domain into policy, training, and exercises. 
• Ensure that programs designed to increase survivability, redundancy, reusability, resilience, rapid replacement, and disaggregation of critical U.S. space assets receive continued support, including those programs ordered in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2019 Title XVI, Subtitle A. 

(From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 3: China’s Ambitions in Space: Contesting the Final Frontier)

Congress urge the Administration to actively participate in international space governance institutions to shape their development in a way that suits the interests of the United States and its allies and partners and to strengthen U.S. engagement with key coalitional allies and partners in the space domain. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 3: China’s Ambitions in Space: Contesting the Final Frontier)

Congress direct the Administration to assess the viability and impact of establishing new military training centers hosted by Indo-Pacific allies and partners to increase connectivity, interoperability, and shared professional military education among countries throughout the region. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 4: Changing Regional Dynamics: Oceania and Singapore)

Congress support the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative to align U.S. budgetary commitments with national security objectives and build the confidence of allies concerning U.S. commitment to security in the Indo-Pacific region. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 4: Changing Regional Dynamics: Oceania and Singapore)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to reinstate Peace Corps programs in Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia and consider expanding their presence in other Pacific Island countries to promote U.S. values while counteracting the spread of China’s authoritarian influence in the Pacific Islands. (From Chapter 4: China’s Global Ambitions, Section 4: Changing Regional Dynamics: Oceania and Singapore)

Congress direct the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a study on the impact of a Taiwan Strait contingency on the supply of high-technology products to the United States from Taiwan, China, Japan, and South Korea. (From Chapter 5: Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to prepare a classified study on how People’s Liberation Army modernization targets to be met by 2035 will impact the ability of the United States to uphold its obligation established in the Taiwan Relations Act to maintain the ability to resist any resort to force that would jeopardize the security of Taiwan. This study would be briefed to all relevant committees of jurisdiction and provide the basis for a 15-year plan of action aimed at deterring Beijing from making a military attempt to unify Taiwan with China. (From Chapter 5: Taiwan)

Congress enact legislation to enhance U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation. Such legislation should contain provisions to: 

• Clarify that direct interactions between uniformed members of the armed forces of the United States and Taiwan in support of Taiwan’s self-defense capability are fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the U.S. position of maintaining relations with the people of Taiwan. 
• Direct the Administration to increase military exchanges and training with Taiwan, including but not limited to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, search and rescue, and any other skills supporting regional peace and security. 
• Direct the Administration to permit active-duty Taiwan military officers to wear their uniforms during visits to the United States. 
• Direct the Administration to permit active-duty U.S. military officers to wear their uniforms during visits to Taiwan. 

(From Chapter 5: Taiwan)

Congress raise the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services to Taiwan to the highest tier set for U.S. allies and partners. Congress also terminate any requirement to provide prior notification of maintenance and sustainment of military equipment and capabilities previously sold to Taiwan. (From Chapter 5: Taiwan)

Congress enact legislation directing the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security to extend export control measures currently in place for mainland China to subsidiaries of Chinese companies established or operating in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 6: Hong Kong)

Congress hold hearings examining technologies subject to ex- port controls for mainland China, but not controlled for Hong Kong. These hearings should request that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security and the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong assess the effectiveness of current export controls in preventing unauthorized transshipment to the Mainland or other destinations. (From Chapter 6: Hong Kong)

Members of Congress participate in congressional delegations to Hong Kong and meet with Hong Kong officials, legislators, civil society, and business representatives in the territory and when they visit the United States. They should also continue to express support for freedom of expression and rule of law in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 6: Hong Kong)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture to identify the extent to which China’s asynchronous biotech review and approval system for agricultural products adversely impacts U.S. industry. As part of its review, the U.S. Department of Agriculture should work with the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to seek bilateral or multilateral measures, as appropriate, to address these impacts. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Agriculture, in collaboration with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to prepare an annual report on its technical engagement with China on food safety, inspection, mechanisms for addressing sanitary and phytosanitary problems, and any technical assistance provided to China to improve its food safety inspection regime. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Agricultural Policies: Trade, Investment, Safety, and Innovation)

Congress consider imposing sanctions on key Chinese state owned enterprises and individuals involved in China’s ongoing militarization of the South China Sea. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations, Section 2: China’s Military Reorganization and Modernization: Implications for the United States)

Congress create a fund to provide additional bilateral assistance for countries that are a target of or vulnerable to Chinese economic or diplomatic pressure, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. The fund should be used to promote digital connectivity, infrastructure, and energy access. The fund could also be used to promote sustainable development, combat corruption, promote transparency, improve rule of law, respond to humanitarian crises, and build the capacity of civil society and the media. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative)

Congress require the U.S. Department of State to prepare a report to Congress on the actions it is taking to provide an alternative, fact-based narrative to counter Chinese messaging on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Such a report should also examine where BRI projects fail to meet international standards and highlight the links between BRI and China’s attempts to suppress information about and misrepresent reporting of its human rights abuses of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: Belt and Road Initiative)

Congress direct the Administration to strengthen cooperation between the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific on shared economic and security interests and policies pertaining to China, including through the following measures: 

• Urge the Administration to engage in regular information sharing and joint monitoring of Chinese investment activities and to share best practices regarding screening of foreign investments with national security implications, including development of common standards for screening mechanisms. 
• Enhance consultations on mitigating the export of dual-use technology to China and identifying other foundational technologies essential for national security.

(From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners)

Congress direct the Administration to discuss in its engagements with the EU and NATO the implications of China’s increasingly close military ties with Russia and growing importance to transatlantic security interests. Such discussions would include how Europe and NATO can promote the exchange of information on common defense and other challenges posed by China and Russia, including both countries’ influence operations. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners)

Congress direct the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to resume meetings under the U.S.-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in 2019 and to identify enhanced negotiating procedures to resolve outstanding issues. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress direct the Administration to produce an interagency report on a whole-of-government strategy for supporting Taiwan’s engagement with the international community, including consideration of, but not limited to, the following actions: 

• Explore opportunities for providing proactive development and security assistance to Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in an effort to encourage them to maintain ties with Taipei. 
• Identify adjustments the United States could take in its relations with Taiwan in response to Beijing altering the cross Strait status quo and taking coercive action to pressure Taipei. 
• Discuss cross-Strait relations and U.S. policy regarding Taiwan in meetings with U.S. allied and partner governments and support an expansion of commercial, cultural, and other exchanges between Taiwan and those countries. 
• Establish a high-level bilateral U.S.-Taiwan development dialogue to encourage Taiwan’s role in promoting sustainable global development.
• Identify key international organizations that would benefit from Taiwan’s expertise and participation, and focus high-level U.S. advocacy efforts to secure Taiwan’s membership or participation in these organizations. 

(From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress consider amending antiboycott laws under the Export Administration Act or pass new legislation to prohibit U.S. companies from complying with China’s efforts to apply pressure on Taiwan. Such legislation could include measures authorizing reciprocal sanctions on Chinese entities in the event of Chinese government retaliation against U.S. companies. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to support the implementation of Taiwan’s new Overall Defense Concept and take actions that support Taiwan’s ability to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability by including Taiwan military personnel as participants or observers in U.S. and U.S.-led multilateral military exercises; conducting regular high-level exchanges of military planning and other advisory personnel pursuant to the Taiwan Travel Act; and considering the potential for assisting Taiwan with the creative acquisition of critical defense articles, including through coproduction of defense technology between U.S. and Taiwan companies. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress consider raising the threshold of congressional notification on sales of defense articles and services to Taiwan to those set for major U.S. allies, and terminating any requirement to provide notification of maintenance and sustainment of Taiwan’s existing capabilities. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress express support for the Tsai Administration’s approach to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Commerce and other relevant government agencies to prepare an unclassified public report, with a classified annex, examining and assessing the adequacy of U.S. export control policy for dual-use technology as it relates to U.S. treatment of Hong Kong and China as separate customs areas. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and Hong Kong)

Congressional interparliamentary groups engage parliamentarians from the United Kingdom, EU, and Taiwan in a biennial review of China’s adherence to the Basic Law, with specific attention to rule of law, freedom of speech and assembly, and press freedom, and issue a report based on its findings after each review. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and Hong Kong)

Members of Congress participate in congressional delegations to Hong Kong and meet with Hong Kong officials, prodemocracy legislators, civil society, and business representatives in the territory and when they visit the United States. In meetings with Hong Kong and Chinese officials, they should raise concerns about Beijing’s adherence to the “one country, two systems” policy and China’s promise to allow Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy.” They should also continue to express support for freedom of expression and rule of law in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and Hong Kong)

Congress require the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to expand the National Trade Estimate’s coverage of China’s digital trade barriers to include an assessment of their impact on U.S. industries and whether they comply with China’s World Trade Organization commitments. (From Chapter 1, U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: U.S. Access to China’s Consumer Market)

Congress require the executive branch to develop a whole-of-government strategy for countering Chinese coercion activities in the Indo-Pacific coordinated through the National Security Council that utilizes diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and legal instruments of national power. (From Chapter 2: U.S.-China Security Relations, Section 3: Hotspots along China’s Maritime Periphery)

Congress increase economic and development assistance and public diplomacy resources to Southeast Asia commensurate with its importance to U.S. strategic, economic, and political interests. A significant portion of additional funding should be directed to democracy, civil society, and governance capacity programs. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Continental Southeast Asia)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development to allocate sufficient funding for the Lower Mekong Initiative and maintain funding at a level consistent with its role as a platform for water policy coordination and as a provider of U.S. expertise for environmentally safe dam construction. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Continental Southeast Asia)

Congress direct the administration to increase cooperation on infrastructure projects supported by U.S. partners and allies, such as Asian Development Bank programs and bilateral projects administered by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. U.S. cooperation should leverage U.S. technical expertise regarding engineering, management, and social and environmental safeguards. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Continental Southeast Asia)

Congress support initiatives that enable cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard and maritime Asian coast guards (possibly to include joint patrols, shiprider agreements, and the expansion of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea [CUES] to include coast guard and other maritime law enforcement agencies), given the prominent role of the China Coast Guard in aggressively advancing China’s territorial ambitions in the East and South China seas. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Northeast Asia)

Congress examine the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance in light of China’s military modernization, paying particular attention to efforts to achieve a joint command structure for planning and executing complex combined operations. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Northeast Asia)

Congress highlight the accomplishments and otherwise elevate the visibility of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which facilitates U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in areas such as public health and disaster relief. Such efforts possibly could include examining whether the program would benefit from additional staffing and funding. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress urge the executive branch to reexamine its practice regarding reciprocal visits by senior U.S. and Taiwan military officers and civilian officials with the aim of increasing high-level exchanges, including Cabinet-level officials and senior National Security Council officials, as part of an effort to enhance U.S.-Taiwan relations. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congress ensure relevant U.S. military personnel are sufficiently familiar with Taiwan’s defense situation by allocating funds for U.S. military personnel to take courses at Taiwan’s defense educational institutions (such as Taiwan’s war college, service command and staff schools, and airborne school) and other courses in Taiwan in an unofficial capacity through the American Institute in Taiwan, in order to ensure the U.S. military is prepared to act in support of Taiwan’s defense if called on to do so. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: China and Taiwan)

Congressional committees of jurisdiction examine and analyze potential U.S. policy options toward Hong Kong, including those to impose costs on Beijing for not abiding by its commitments to the territory, given mainland China’s increased intrusions into Hong Kong’s autonomy. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and Hong Kong)

Members of Congress participate in congressional delegations to Hong Kong and meet with Hong Kong officials, legislators, and business representatives in the territory and while they visit the United States. In these meetings, they should raise concerns about Beijing’s adherence to the “one country, two systems” policy and the recent crackdown on prodemocracy activists, including the imprisonment of Joshua Wong and others. They should also continue to express support for freedom of expression and rule of law in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and Hong Kong)

Congress require the U.S. Department of Commerce to collect information from U.S. companies that do business in China concerning requests from the Chinese government regarding censorship, surveillance, and data transfers, and report its findings to Congress. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 5: China’s Domestic Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and Cyber Diplomacy)

Congress modify U.S. Federal Communications Commission regulations to require greater transparency regarding Chinese government ownership of media outlets and the clear labeling of media content sponsored by the Chinese government. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 5: China’s Domestic Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and Cyber Diplomacy)

Congress urge the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, when renegotiating the existing Bilateral Film Agreement between the United States and China, to increase the number of films that have access to Chinese theaters and increase the revenue sharing arrangement to a level reflecting the median arrangement existing around the globe. In addition, the arrangement should reserve a minimum of 50 percent of the quota for films from studios and independent distributors that are not owned or controlled by Chinese interests. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 5: China’s Domestic Information Controls, Global Media Influence, and Cyber Diplomacy)

Congress direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation in concert with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration to expand outreach to and develop educational materials and tools for U.S. academics, businesses, venture capitalists, and startups in dual-use sectors on potential risks associated with Chinese investors and partners, the Chinese government’s role in acquiring technology through programs such as the Thousand Talents Program and Project 111, and steps to prevent industrial and cyber espionage. (From Chapter 4: China’s High Tech Development, Section 1: China’s Pursuit of Dominance in Computing, Robotics, and Biotechnology)

Congress create an office within the International Trade Administration whose sole purpose is to identify and initiate antidumping and countervailing duty cases to ensure a more effective and timely response to China’s unfair trade practices. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: State-Owned Enterprises, Overcapacity, and China’s Market Economy Status)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to prepare a report analyzing U.S. exposure to China’s financial sector and the impact of China’s financial sector reforms on the U.S. and global financial systems. This report should also identify the policies the U.S. government is or should be adopting to protect U.S. interests in response to this changing environment. (From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s 13th Five-Year Plan)

Members of Congress and Congressional staff seek opportunities to advance U.S.-Taiwan economic, political, and security relations, support Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and draw attention to Taiwan’s democratic achievements and contributions to the international community. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Taiwan)

Congress urge the executive branch to make available to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, defense articles and services required to address the continuing shift in the cross-Strait military balance toward China. (From Chapter 3: China in the World, Section 2: China and Taiwan)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to reexamine its policy guidelines on reciprocal visits by senior U.S. and Taiwan military officers and civilian officials with the aim of increasing high-level exchanges. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Taiwan)

Congress request briefings by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on the status of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement negotiations with Taiwan and direct the USTR to identify enhanced negotiating procedures to resolve outstanding issues and ensure an accelerated path to conclude such talks. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Taiwan)

Congress express that China’s apparent abduction and detention of five Hong Kong and foreign national booksellers based in Hong Kong for selling banned books to customers in mainland China violates its commitments to maintaining a ‘‘high degree of autonomy’’ in Hong Kong under the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ framework. In addition, members of Congress in their meetings in China should continue to express support for human rights and rule of law in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Hong Kong)

Congress continue to renew annual reporting requirements of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, in an effort to ensure policymakers have the most up-to-date and authoritative information about developments in Hong Kong. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Hong Kong)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to prepare a report that assesses whether Hong Kong has maintained a ‘‘sufficient degree of autonomy’’ under the “one country, two systems” policy, due to the deterioration of freedom of expression in Hong Kong and Beijing’s increasing encroachment. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Hong Kong)

Congress require the U.S. Department of State to produce an unclassified report assessing China’s compliance with UN resolutions on North Korea. (From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: China and North Korea)

Congress consider legislation requiring the President to submit a request to Congress for approval before any change occurs, either for the country as a whole or for individual sectors or entities, in China’s status as a non-market economy. Under such legislation, any change to the designation of China could not proceed without consent of both Houses of Congress. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Foreign Investment Climate in China.

Congress direct U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies to conduct an analysis and legal assessment of alleged anticompetitive behavior by Chinese antitrust enforcers, and report in full on enforcement activities. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Foreign Investment Climate in China.

Congress expand the guidelines for consultation and transparency relating to trade negotiations covered by Trade Promotion Authority to include negotiations on a Bilateral Investment Treaty between the United States and China. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Foreign Investment Climate in China.

Congress urge the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate consultations with China’s Ministry of Commerce to identify the extent to which China’s policy regarding subsidies and other incentives for purchases of domestically-produced new energy vehicles may violate its World Trade Organization commitments and what steps should be taken to address any inconsistencies with those commitments. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: Foreign Investment Climate in China.

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report that analyzes U.S. exposure to China’s financial sector, the progress of China’s financial sector reforms, and the effect of China’s financial sector reforms on the U.S. and global financial systems, and identifies the policies the U.S. government is adopting to protect U.S. interests in light of this changing environment. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s State-Led Market Reform and Competitiveness Agenda

Congress urge the U.S. Department of Commerce to undertake a comprehensive review and prepare a report on China’s Made in China 2025 and Internet Plus initiatives, including their forced localization of manufacturing and research and development requirements, to determine their potential impact on domestic U.S. production and market access for U.S. firms. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s State-Led Market Reform and Competitiveness Agenda

Congress direct the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of Energy, and U.S. Department of Commerce to jointly prepare a report that outlines China’s stated targets to address pollution and climate change, and evaluates whether the Chinese government has allocated sufficient resources (including expenditures) to meet those commitments. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s State-Led Market Reform and Competitiveness Agenda

Congress consider legislation amending the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 to require an annual review by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security of the steps taken by all federal agencies to ensure that adequate systems are in place to protect cyber assets. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: Commercial Cyber Espionage and Barrier to Digital Trade in China

Congress evaluate existing consumer right-to-know laws to determine whether a cloud-based computing company has an affirmative duty to identify the physical location of its cloud-based assets. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: Commercial Cyber Espionage and Barrier to Digital Trade in China

Congress direct appropriate jurisdictional entities to undertake a review of (1) the classification of satellites and related articles on the U.S. Munitions List under the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations and (2) the prohibitions on exports of Commerce Control List satellites and related technologies to China under the Export Administration Regulations, in order to determine which systems and technologies China is likely to be able to obtain on the open market regardless of U.S. restrictions and which are critical technologies that merit continued U.S. protection. From Chapter 2: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Space and Counterspace Programs

Congress allocate additional funds to the Director of National Intelligence Open Source Center for the translation and analysis of Chinese-language technical and military writings, in order to deepen U.S. understanding of China’s defense strategy, particularly related to space. From Chapter 2: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Space and Counterspace Programs

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to provide an unclassified estimate of the People’s Liberation Army Second Artillery Force’s inventory of missiles and launchers, by type, in future iterations of its Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, as included previously but suspended following the 2010 edition. From Chapter 3: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving china, Section 3: China’s Offensive Missile Forces

Congress direct the U.S. Department of Defense to prepare a report on the potential benefits and costs of incorporating ground-launched short-, medium-, and intermediate-range conventional cruise and ballistic missile systems into the United States’ defensive force structure in the Asia Pacific, in order to explore how such systems might help the U.S. military sustain a cost-effective deterrence posture. From Chapter 3: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving china, Section 3: China’s Offensive Missile Forces

Congress continue to support “next-generation” missile defense initiatives such as directed energy and rail gun technologies, and require the U.S. Department of Defense to report to committees of jurisdiction on the status of current component sourcing plans for the development and production of directed energy weapons. From Chapter 3: Security and Foreign Policy Issues Involving china, Section 3: China’s Offensive Missile Forces

Congress request classified briefings from the U.S. Intelligence Community on the nature of U.S.-China cooperation on counterterrorism to ensure the U.S. government is not inadvertently supporting Chinese counterterror policies and tactics that undermine human rights. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Central Asia

Members of Congress and their staffs consider traveling to Central Asia, and, when doing so, engage with U.S. business community and nongovernmental organizations to discuss ways of improving human rights, rule of law, environmental protection, and business environment. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Central Asia

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to prepare a report assessing the effectiveness of recent U.S. efforts to enhance the maritime security capabilities of allies and partners in Southeast Asia and identifying the remaining challenges and opportunities. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Southeast Asia

Congress urge the Administration to enhance its support for regional information sharing institutions focused on maritime security in Southeast Asia. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Southeast Asia

Congress direct the U.S. Government Accountability Office to expand its August 2015 report Southeast Asia: Trends in U.S. and Chinese Economic Engagement to evaluate whether Chinese government funded investment and assistance projects in Southeast Asia negatively affect U.S.-funded projects in Southeast Asia. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: China and Southeast Asia

Congress urge the Administration to make available to Taiwan, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, defense articles and services required to address the continuing shift in the cross Strait military balance toward China. From Chapter 3, China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Congress direct the Administration to invite Taiwan to participate at least as an observer at U.S.-led bilateral and multilateral military and security exercises, including future Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Cyber Storm exercises. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Congress encourage the Administration to increase its public support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations,* which would help Taiwan expand its status and legitimacy in the international community. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

• *These organizations may include: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, and International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

Congress require the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of Commerce to jointly prepare a classified report on Taiwan’s role in the U.S. strategy in Asia. The report should include an overview of Taiwan’s current role in the strategy; U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation and a description of all joint programs; and opportunities for Taiwan’s inclusion in U.S. Asia strategy. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong, and that Congress encourage senior Administration officials, including the secretaries of State, Defense, and Commerce, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress sustain the language in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2016 reauthorizing the report requirement under the U.S.- Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 supporting human rights and democracy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress urge the U.S. Department of State to increase its public diplomacy efforts in Hong Kong in support of press freedom, media independence, and academic freedom. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress engage parliamentarians from the United Kingdom in an interparliamentary review of China’s adherence to the Basic Law since the handover of Hong Kong to China in 1997, with specific attention to rule of law, progress in achieving universal suffrage, and press freedom. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress direct the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) to provide briefings to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees on its activities, since its creation, to coordinate and improve upon the enforcement of U.S. laws against unfair trade. Congress should examine whether providing statutory authority for ITEC would enhance enforcement activities and ensure that adequate resources are available and that other Departments and Agencies are responsive to its requests. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress consider whether state and local governments should be treated as interested parties under laws against unfair trade and thereby have standing to bring or participate in trade cases. Further, Congress should consider creating a private right of action allowing U.S. companies to take legal action against competitors directly in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, rather than having to rely on U.S. government assistance. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress seek clarification from the executive branch as to its interpretation of Article 15 of China’s World Trade Organization Accession Protocol concerning China’s achievement of “market economy” status. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress direct the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) to brief the Joint Economic Committee on existing data collection efforts within the Administration regarding investments by Chinese entities in the United States. CEA shall describe the differing data sets available from public and private sources and the extent to which existing data provides adequate information to U.S. policy makers to assess changing trends and the potential economic implications from these investments. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress require the Department of Commerce to prepare a comprehensive analysis of excess productive capacity in China across a range of sectors, including, but not limited to, steel, glass, paper, cement and solar products, and provide a report to the President and to Congress on what actions should be taken to address this problem. This report shall be prepared annually for a period of five years, at a minimum. In addition, the Administration should consult with major trade allies with similar concerns about Chinese overcapacity in these sectors to determine what multilateral engagement would effectively deal with this problem. As part of this approach, the Administration shall evaluate the effectiveness of other efforts to address global and China’s overcapacity in certain sectors, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Steel Committee, the U.S.-China Steel Dialogue, and JCCT and S&ED talks. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress require the Office of the United States Trade Representative to brief the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, within 60 days, on trade enforcement issues involving China which have been initiated or announced since 2009, but have not yet been resolved, and identify what steps will be taken to ensure a more rapid resolution of such issues. The briefing shall include an estimate of the economic value to the U.S. in terms of production and job creation, if the identified market barrier or impediment were eliminated. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 2: U.S.-China Bilateral Trade and Economic Challenges.

Congress urge the Institutes of Medicine of the National Academies to convene a task force to assess purchasing decisions by U.S. wholesalers, retailers, and healthcare providers with regard to China-origin drugs and drug ingredients, and to recommend ways in which to improve information sharing and coordination with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services

Congress monitor the efficacy of the FDA’s regulatory activities in China, consider ways to optimize the use of appropriated funding, and identify what other steps are necessary to protect the health and safety of the U.S. population. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services

Congress adopt measures that make greater use of “track and trace” technology. To this end, Congress should: (1) urge the U.S. government negotiators to demand that China harmonize with internationally recognized standards its unique device identifiers for medical devices and its serialized verification of APIs, so as to allow for equivalency with U.S. systems and standards; (2) make the use of serial numbers for product verification at U.S. pharmacies mandatory at all times, not only in cases where a product is suspect (as currently spelled out in the Drug Quality and Security Act). From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services

Congress direct the Trade Policy Review Group of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative to review the interests of U.S. healthcare goods and services providers in the Chinese market, Chinese market barriers, and opportunities to promote human health in China in ways that support U.S. consumer and business interests. Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 3: China’s Health Care Industry, Drug Safety, and Market Access for U.S. Medical Goods and Services

Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct an assessment of government-led U.S.-China collaborative initiatives on clean energy. This assessment should describe the nature of collaboration, including funding, participation, and reporting on the outcomes; consider whether the intellectual property rights of U.S. researchers and companies are being protected; examine whether Chinese state-owned enterprises are benefitting from U.S. taxpayer-funded research; investigate if any U.S. companies, universities and labs participating in government-led collaboration with China have been subject to cyber penetrations originating in China; and evaluate the benefits of this collaboration for the United States. Further, this assessment should examine redundancies, if any, among various U.S.-China government-led collaborative programs, and make suggestions for improving collaboration. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S.-China Clean Energy Competition

Congress require that the Department of Energy, in consultation with the Department of Commerce, identify barriers to market access in China for clean and renewable energy products and services and their impact on U.S. production and job creation, and report to the committees of jurisdiction, within 120 days, on specific action plans to address these barriers. As part of this report, the Departments shall identify sourcing patterns that have changed over the last 10 years in these sectors and also the extent to which U.S. companies are producing in the Chinese market to serve that market and whether they were previously able to manufacture these products in the United States for export to China. From Chapter 1: U.S.-China Economic and Trade Relations, Section 4: U.S.-China Clean Energy Competition

Congress ensure the adequacy of open source collection, production, and dissemination capabilities vis-a`-vis security issues involving China. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Military Modernization

Congress direct U.S. Pacific Command to brief Congress on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s participation in the Rim of the Pacific-2014 exercise. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Military Modernization

Congress direct the Department of Defense to provide to Congress its purpose and rationale for its military-to-military engagement planning with the People’s Liberation Army, including proposed programs already discussed with the People’s Liberation Army. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Military Modernization

Given the importance of understanding China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile programs, Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to provide an unclassified report, with a classified annex that examines China’s nuclear and conventional ballistic missile capabilities, intentions, and force structure. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 2: China’s Military Modernization

Members of Congress reaffirm their support for human rights, freedom of expression, and rule of law in China and raise citizens’ rights to freedom of speech, expression, and religion in their meetings with Chinese government officials. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability

Congress support the efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, and the National Endowment for Democracy to strengthen governance and improve the well-being of Chinese citizens through capacity-building training programs and exchanges. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability

Congress closely monitor U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation to ensure the United States is not endorsing or providing any support for China’s suppression of Chinese citizens, including Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other ethnic minorities. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability

Congress continue to support and fund media outlets that promote the free flow of information and Internet freedom within China. From Chapter 2: Military and Security Issues Involving China, Section 3: China’s Domestic Stability

Congress require the Administration to submit a one-time interagency report clarifying the progress of the Asia rebalance policy. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

Congress emphasize the value of the U.S.-Australia alliance in its interactions with Australian legislators. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

Congress express support for Japan’s efforts to exercise ‘‘collective self-defense’’ in its interactions with Japanese legislators. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

Congress examine the Administration’s progress on greater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) integration and sharing between the United States and its allies and associates in East Asia and Oceania. In addition, Congress should support efforts by the Department of Defense to improve ISR capabilities of allies and security associates in East Asia and develop a ‘‘common operating picture’’ for the East and South China Seas. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

Congress urge the Administration to encourage allies to develop their missile defense capabilities. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and Asia’s Evolving Security Architecture

Appropriate Congressional committees require the Departments of Defense and State to jointly produce a classified report on U.S. efforts to engage with China, South Korea, and Japan on issues related to North Korean stability. The report should include a discussion of prospects for political crisis or regime collapse in North Korea; a discussion of each country’s outlook and approach to contingency planning for North Korea collapse scenarios; a detailed explanation of the current state of engagement among these countries on contingency planning for North Korea collapse scenarios; and an overview of existing track two dialogues aimed at enhancing understanding and cooperation among these countries on issues related to North Korean stability, to include an assessment of the effectiveness of these track two dialogues. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

Congress require future classified and unclassified Department of Defense reports on ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ to include a full discussion of China’s activities impacting the military and security situation in North Korea. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

Congress support nongovernmental organizations that encourage democracy and promote human rights and economic liberalization in North Korea. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

Congress support nongovernmental organizations that facilitate exchanges and dialogues among the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China on issues related to security and weapons proliferation on the Korean Peninsula. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

Members of Congress and Congressional staff in their interactions with official delegations from China exchange views on North Korea. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Recent Developments in China’s Relationship with North Korea

Congress direct the Administration to permit and encourage official travel to Taiwan for uniformed military personnel above the level of O6 and urge Cabinet-level officials to make more frequent visits to Taiwan to promote commercial, technological, people-to-people, and military exchanges. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Congress urge the Administration to make available to Taiwan the arms and equipment it needs for its self-defense, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, due to the shifting cross-Strait military balance. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Congress encourage the Administration to increase its public support of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Congress encourage the Administration to strengthen economic cooperation between the United States and Taiwan to further their economic growth and prosperity. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Taiwan

Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong to engage with high-level administrators on such issues as democratic election. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Members of Congress, jointly with members of British Parliament, promote Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy in accordance with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress renew the biennial reporting requirements of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress reconvene a congressional caucus on Hong Kong to ensure continuous attention to the region’s democracy and civil rights issues. From Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 4: Hong Kong

Congress direct the Administration to press China for more cooperation with the international community in order to address the global economic risks of unregulated and underregulated shadow banking and ask the Department of the Treasury to provide an annual report to Congress on the risks of shadow banking. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Governance and Accountability in China’s Financial System)

Congress direct the Administration, in any bilateral investment treaty negotiations, to make fair and equitable market access and treatment for financial services firms a priority. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Governance and Accountability in China’s Financial System)

Congress direct the Administration to assist the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board by encouraging China to develop better regulatory oversight enforcement capabilities and more transparent markets, during annual and biannual bilateral dialogues, as well as multilateral dialogues. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Governance and Accountability in China’s Financial System)

Congress monitor the implementation of the U.S.-China Plan of Strategic Cooperation in Agriculture (2012–2017) to ensure that U.S. funding is being allocated in such a way as to improve the safety, sustainability, efficiency, and security of food production in China and the United States. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress urge the Secretary of Agriculture to engage, as part of the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, with his/her Chinese counterparts to address those Chinese policies and practices that limit U.S. exports of value-added products. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress direct the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center (ITEC) to conduct a review of the selective use of value added tax (VAT) rebates by China and determine whether they have a trade-distorting effect and whether the selective use of VAT rebates is consistent with the original intent of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provision allowing for VAT rebates. The ITEC should prepare a report for the U.S. Trade Representative and the relevant Committees of jurisdiction and identify what steps should be taken to address any GATT inconsistencies, should they be found. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress direct the USDA to negotiate with China to synchronize approvals of biotechnology to ensure stable and predictable market access for U.S. seed companies and crop growers in the Chinese market. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress require that the USDA prepare an annual report on competitive factors in the pork industry. In preparing such reports, the department shall evaluate the impact, if any, of the recent purchase of Smithfield Foods on the ability of other U.S. producers to export pork products to China. In addition, the report shall identify any changing pricing structures throughout the pork production chain to determine whether there is price or profit suppression as a result of the Smithfield transaction. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress direct the USDA to exercise extreme caution in negotiating equivalency status for Chinese exports of processed poultry using Chinese-origin birds. Congress should also increase its support of USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service in its role as protector of meat and poultry food safety so that the United States serves as a world model for high-quality, science-based regulations. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress require the Secretary of Agriculture to prepare a report to Congress identifying those organic food products being imported into the United States from China. The report should include a comprehensive evaluation of the different methodologies employed by the United States and China to certify that a product is organic and what steps, if any, are being taken to harmonize any discrepancies that might exist. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress evaluate whether a requirement that U.S. food importers purchase insurance against food-borne illnesses and pathogens from Chinese imports would improve food safety. Such a program would involve private sector risk insurance with insurance companies evaluating the safety of various sources and charging risk-based premiums based on the methods employed by Chinese exporters to address food-borne illnesses and pathogens. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Agriculture Policy, Food Regulation, and the U.S.-China Agriculture Trade)

Congress adopt legislation clarifying the actions companies are permitted to take regarding tracking intellectual property stolen through cyber intrusions. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Congress amend the Economic Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 1831–1839) to permit a private right of action when trade secrets are stolen. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Congress support the Administration’s efforts to achieve a high standard of protection of intellectual property rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Congress encourage the Administration to partner with other countries to establish an international list of individuals, groups, and organizations engaged in commercial cyber espionage. The Administration and partner governments should develop a process for the list’s validation, adjudication, and shared access. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Congress urge the Administration to continue to enhance its sharing of information about cyber threats with the private sector, particularly small- and medium-sized companies. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Congress urge the Department of Defense to continue to develop the U.S.-China maritime security relationship in order to strengthen strategic trust. The relationship should be within the bounds of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–65) and based on the principles of reciprocity and transparency. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: China’s Maritime Disputes)

Congress fund U.S. Coast Guard engagement efforts with coast guard and maritime law enforcement agencies in the Western Pacific to increase understanding among civilian maritime bodies in the Asia Pacific. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: China’s Maritime Disputes)

Congress support efforts by the Department of Defense to strengthen cooperation with China on counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and the Middle East and North Africa)

Congress consider the merits of including fuel oil purchases in the current sanctions regime prohibiting countries from purchasing crude oil from Iran. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and the Middle East and North Africa)

Congress work with the Departments of State, Commerce, and the Treasury to utilize the full range of incentives and disincentives to encourage China to reduce its ties with Iran, including exploring conditioning Chinese energy companies’ future investments in the United States on limiting commercial ties with Iran. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and the Middle East and North Africa)

Congress urge the Department of State to elevate the U.S.- China Middle East Dialogue to include an annual meeting at the Cabinet level and to increase meetings at the undersecretary level from once to twice per year. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and the Middle East and North Africa)

Congress direct the Administration to provide a report to Congress on China’s enforcement of its export controls, to include an assessment of the level of scrutiny the Chinese government applies to end users in transfers that are of proliferation concern. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 1: China and the Middle East and North Africa)

Congress urge Cabinet-level officials to visit Taiwan to promote commercial, technological, and people-to-people exchanges and direct the Administration to permit official travel to Taiwan for Department of State and Department of Defense personnel above the rank of office director or, for uniformed military personnel, above the level of O6. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 2: Taiwan)

Congress urge the State Department to negotiate with the Macanese government to fix the shortcomings in its regulatory framework. Potential reforms would include implementing an effective asset-freezing mechanism, an increase in due diligence procedures in casinos, reduction in the high threshold for reporting suspicious transactions within casinos, establishing more transparent cross-border reporting requirements, and a requirement that junket operators and their affiliates disclose detailed financial information and implement stricter licensing requirements. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong)

Congress reconvene a congressional caucus on Hong Kong to ensure continuous attention to the region’s democracy and civil rights issues. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong)

Congress adopt a resolution urging China to keep its commitments to universal suffrage as articulated in the 1984 SinoBritish Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong)

Congress reaffirm its support for human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong)

Congress renew the biennial reporting requirements of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992. (Chapter 3: China and the World, Section 3: Macau and Hong Kong)

Congress examine the access of small- and medium-sized enterprises to the remedies contained in the U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws. As part of this examination, Congress should consider whether to (1) grant enhanced authority to initiate antidumping and countervailing duty cases to the Senate and House Committees most responsible for international trade; and (2) include state and local governments as interested parties under the U.S. trade laws. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned and State-controlled Enterprises)

Congress adopt legislation that would provide a private right of action for domestic producers who suffer injury from antidumping and countervailing duty violations from the operations of Chinese state-owned or –affiliated firms operating in the U.S. market. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned and State-controlled Enterprises)

Congress assess the ability of the Office of the United States Trade Representative to adequately investigate, develop, resolve and/or adjudicate trade complaints. As part of this assessment, Congress should evaluate the availability of, and access to, information necessary to address unfair trade complaints; whether it is advisable to provide USTR with subpoena authority; and, if so, the nature of such authority. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: The Evolving U.S.-China Trade and Investment Relationship)

Congress monitor efforts to measure trade in value-added, such as the OECD–WTO joint initiative, and identify the potential impacts of value added measurements on U.S. trade law. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: The Evolving U.S.-China Trade and Investment Relationship)

Congress conduct a review of existing legal penalties for companies found to engage in, or benefit from, industrial espionage. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Cyber Activities)

Committees of jurisdiction seek input from relevant U.S. government agencies and international organizations to assess disparities in estimates of the size and disposition of China’s nuclear forces. (Chapter 2: China’s Impact on U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: China’s Nuclear Developments)

Congress direct the Department of Defense to work with U.S. friends and allies in the Asia Pacific region to strengthen mechanisms to share information on maritime activity in the South China Sea. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China and the South China Sea)

Congress urge the U.S. Navy to conduct regular transit operations in critical waterways in ways that demonstrate and reinforce U.S. values and interests related to freedom of navigation. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China and the South China Sea)

Congress direct the U.S. Coast Guard to take steps to promote the formation of, and participate in, a regional coast guard forum in Southeast Asia modeled on the North Pacific Coast Guard Forum. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China and the South China Sea)

Congress urge the administration to remain engaged with Taiwan officials regarding Taiwan’s future defense needs, particularly as they pertain to sales of arms and equipment such as may be necessary to offset the growing capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army for coercive power projection. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: China and Taiwan)

Congress reauthorize Section 301 of the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which requires the U.S. secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress on political, economic, and social developments in Hong Kong of relevance to the United States. This should include reporting on mainland interference in Hong Kong’s internal political affairs and Chinese efforts to leverage the territory as a platform for the internationalization of the RMB. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: China and Hong Kong)

Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong and that Congress encourage senior administration officials, including the secretary of State, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: China and Hong Kong)

Members of Congress and congressional bodies participating in transatlantic legislative dialogues such as the Transatlantic Policy Network or the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue promote the discussion of economic, political, and security issues as they relate to China and Asia within these dialogues. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 1: China and Europe)

Congress direct the Department of Defense to survey NATO’s current and planned exchanges and interactions with China to ensure that U.S. contributions are in compliance with the limitations enumerated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 1: China and Europe)

Congress urge the administration to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on investment screening regimes and trade policy related to China with the European Union and individual EU member states through appropriate venues. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 1: China and Europe)

Congress urge the European Union and EU member states to strengthen the implementation of the 1989 Tiananmen arms embargo. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 1: China and Europe)

Congress assess the mandate, activities, and effectiveness of the Department of Defense’s Strategic Materials Protection Board in order to ensure that the board meets its statutory responsibilities as mandated in 10 U.S.C. § 187.2 (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 2: China’s Demand for and Control of Global Resources)

Congress maintain support for the U.S.-initiated Mekong River Initiative’s Mekong Partnership for the Environment. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 2: China’s Demand for and Control of Global Resources)

Congress maintain support for nongovernmental organizations involved in the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Economic Support Fund for Tibet and the agency’s Environmental Cooperation—Asia (ECO-Asia) programs for Water and Sanitation and Environmental Governance. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 2: China’s Demand for and Control of Global Resources)

Congress direct the U.S. Department of State to assess the utility, interest of affected countries, and significance for the United States of creating an Asian regional water security framework to facilitate cooperative agreements among riparian countries and to promote transparency and information sharing on water security issues. (Chapter 4: China’s Global Reach, Section 2: China’s Demand for and Control of Global Resources)

Congress ensure that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center have sufficient resources so that the agencies can bring the necessary challenges against Chinese ‘‘innovation mercantilism’’ before the WTO. (Chapter 5: Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an Innovative Society)

Congress request that the National Academy of Sciences prepare a comprehensive study assessing China’s strategies, policies and programs to become an innovative society and enhance its indigenous innovation. In conducting this study, the academy shall identify specific actions taken by the Chinese government to achieve the innovation goals outlined in the 12th Five-Year Plan. The academy shall include an evaluation of those leading-edge technologies where Chinese capabilities are comparable to or exceed those of the United States and provide appropriate measurement metrics. In addition, the academy shall identify the extent to which industrial espionage has been used as a tool to advance China’s interest with specific examples, where possible. The academy shall also report on the extent to which U.S. companies have assisted in China’s technological development. (Chapter 5: Assessing China’s Efforts to Become an Innovative Society)

Congress assess the extent to which existing laws provide for effective remedies against the anticompetitive actions of Chinese state-owned or state-invested enterprises operating in the U.S. market. Appropriate remedies, if they are not readily available, should also be considered. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investmen

Congress urge the administration to include in any bilateral investment treaty with China the principles of nondiscrimination and competitive neutrality between SOEs and other state-invested or -supported entities and private enterprises. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investment)

Congress assess China’s new national security review process for foreign investment to determine whether it is being used as a trade barrier. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investment)

Congress urge the administration to review federally subsidized contracts provided under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and report on the extent to which Chinese-produced goods and services were procured using such funds. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investment)

Congress urge the administration to direct the USTR to move aggressively to bring more WTO cases against China for violating its obligations under the WTO Subsidies Agreement. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investment)

Congress urge the administration to direct the USTR to strengthen its mandated annual review of China’s compliance with its WTO obligations by adding conclusions and recommendations to its annual report to Congress. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: Chinese State-owned Enterprises and U.S.-China Bilateral Investment)

Congress request the administration to report on whether procurement catalogues are actionable under WTO obligations. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress instruct the administration to insist that all procurement catalogues at all levels of government be explicitly recalled in order to comply with assurances by President Hu Jintao to separate government procurement from the catalogues. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress urge the administration to raise with China in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and in other appropriate bilateral and multilateral venues the need for China to table a serious offer to join the Government Procurement Agreement that provides reciprocal opportunities for access to the estimated $1 trillion in procurement controlled by central, provincial, and local governments as well as state-affiliated entities. If China fails to engage in serious negotiations, the U.S. government should restrict access to Chinese suppliers to government procurement opportunities and should coordinate policies with the states to limit procurement contracts with China. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress instruct the administration to make a top priority within the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade and the Strategic and Economic Dialogue negotiations an agreement to lower the threshold for criminal prosecution of cases of piracy and counterfeiting of business and entertainment software. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress recommend the administration adopt a more reciprocal trading relationship in critical areas, such as intellectual property protection. The United States should demand the same level of treatment from its major trading partners that it provides to those other nations. The administration should identify those sectors that China has failed to open up to trade in goods and services and identify the practices that act to nullify and impair anticipated economic benefits for U.S. producers and service providers. The administration should seek the elimination of such practices in a timely manner and, if unable to gain sufficient market access, should evaluate what reciprocal actions may be appropriate. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress urge the administration to insist that China audit the use of licensed software on government computers rather than just audit the budget for software procurement. The audit should be performed by the World Bank. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

The President should direct USTR to move aggressively to bring cases to the WTO to enforce intellectual property rights. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Indigenous Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights)

Congress hold hearings to assess the success of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade in addressing Chinese actions to implement its WTO commitments, including with regard to the issue of technology transfers. In preparation for such hearings, Congress should request that the Government Accountability Office prepare an inventory of specific measures agreed to as part of these bilateral discussions and the implementation efforts of the Chinese. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and Technology Development and Transfers to China)

The administration work with the Chinese leaders in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade talks to identify specific commodities and products in the case where supply does not adequately meet demand in China and where enhanced access for U.S. goods might help alleviate inflationary pressures. Specific attention should be given to agricultural commodities and Chinese barriers that may limit access to the Chinese market for American goods and products. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 5: China’s Internal Dilemmas)

Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to conduct a review of efforts by the Chinese government to censor content on the Internet and identify the extent to which any foreign technology providers may be assisting the government in its efforts. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 5: China’s Internal Dilemmas)

The relevant Congressional committees investigate the adequacy of security for the Department of Defense’s logistics data system, the time-phased force deployment data system, to ensure that the data therein are secure from a cyberattack. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s ‘‘Area Control Military Strategy’’)

Congress direct the Government Accountability Office to evaluate the Department of Defense’s early warning systems to ensure that the department will have sufficient timely warning of a PLA attack in the event of a conflict. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s ‘‘Area Control Military Strategy’’)

Congress require that the Department of Defense conduct periodic peaceful naval and air exercises in the East Asian maritime region to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to freedom of navigation. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s ‘‘Area Control Military Strategy’’)

Congress assess the adequacy of funding for Department of Defense programs that ensure the military’s ability to operate effectively against China’s Area Control Strategy measures. Such programs could include, at a minimum, robust theater ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, advanced air-to-air combat, command and control, and electronic warfare capabilities. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s ‘‘Area Control Military Strategy’’)

Congress encourage the administration to continue to work diplomatically and militarily with regional allies and friends to improve their capacity to resist China’s Area Control Strategy capabilities. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s ‘‘Area Control Military Strategy’’)

Congress mandate that the Department of Defense (and other government space operators, as appropriate) assess and upon their preparedness for potential Chinese counterspace activities. To the extent that commercial entities provide essential services, assessments should also cover their systems. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: The Implications of China’s Civil and Military Space Activities)

Congress, in light of China’s continued investments in North Korea, hold hearings to evaluate the effectiveness of expanding North Korean sanctions to cover foreign firms investing in North Korea’s natural resource industry. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 1: An Overview of China’s Relations with North Korea and Iran)

Congress investigate the extent to which the People’s Liberation Army is becoming a more influential actor in China’s foreign policy-making. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 2: Actors in China’s Foreign Policy)

Members of Congress make an effort to engage with multiple official and unofficial foreign policy actors during their trips to China in order to better understand and establish channels of communication with these actors. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 2: Actors in China’s Foreign Policy)

Congress request from the administration an update on the Taiwan submarine program that was approved for sale by the U.S. government in 2001. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 3: Taiwan)

Congress explore in hearings the implications for the United States and the region of closer China-Taiwan relations. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 3: Taiwan)

Congress reauthorize Section 301 of the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which requires the U.S. secretary of State to submit an annual report to Congress on political, social, and economic developments in Hong Kong as they relate to the United States. This should include reporting on China’s measures to use Hong Kong as a platform for the internationalization of the renminbi. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 4: Hong Kong)

Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong and that Congress encourage senior administration officials, including the secretary of State, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 4: Hong Kong)

Congress encourage its Members to raise the issue of preserving Hong Kong’s special status when meeting with members of China’s National People’s Congress. (Chapter 3: China’s Foreign Policy, Section 4: Hong Kong)

Congress evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. government public diplomacy programs in the East Asian region. (Chapter 4: China’s Public Diplomacy Initiatives Regarding Foreign and National Security Policy)

Congress urge the administration to seek clarification on the Chinese government’s views as to what represents a ‘‘core interest’’ as well as what this formulation means for U.S.-China relations, and the implications for U.S. allies and friends. (Chapter 4: China’s Public Diplomacy Initiatives Regarding Foreign and National Security Policy)

Congress ensure that its own Members are made fully aware of the Chinese institutional actors engaged in exchange programs involving officials of the U.S. Government. (Chapter 4: China’s Public Diplomacy Initiatives Regarding Foreign and National Security Policy)

The Commission recommends that Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to monitor steps taken by China to promote the international use of the RMB, with a focus on the implications of such steps for the position of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2010)

The Commission recommends that Congress evaluate steps that might be necessary to ensure that China’s currency manipulation, undervaluation, or misalignment does not adversely affect the competitiveness of U.S. producers, including whether it should initiate action under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: The Implications and Repercussions of China’s Holding U.S. Debt)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the Department of the Treasury to designate China as a currency manipulator in its semiannual report. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: The Implications and Repercussions of China’s Holding U.S. Debt)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to encourage China to develop a national, provincial, and local procurement regime based on performance and value rather than on local content and the origin of intellectual property. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Evaluating China’s Past and Future Role in the World Trade Organization)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage USTR to step up enforcement of WTO rules and U.S. laws by requesting consultations at the WTO on China’s noncompliance with its obligations under WTO articles of accession, including denial of national treatment, export restrictions, and illegal subsidies. If China’s noncompliance is not adequately resolved through such consultations, Congress should encourage USTR to file a formal WTO complaint. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: Evaluating China’s Past and Future Role in the World Trade Organization)

The Commission recommends that Congress assess the adequacy of resources available to Department of Defense’s programs that seek to defend U.S. forward-deployed bases. Key programs include theater missile defense and early warning systems, hardened structures and hangers, air defense systems, and runway repair kits. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Growing Air and Conventional Missile Capabilities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the Department of Defense to continue to strengthen its interaction with allies in the Western Pacific. In addition, the Department should expand its outreach to other nations in Asia in order to demonstrate the U.S.’s continued commitment to the region. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Growing Air and Conventional Missile Capabilities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to work with allies in the region to strengthen their air and missile defense capabilities. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Growing Air and Conventional Missile Capabilities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to investigate whether Beijing’s policies for developing its aviation industry conflict with China’s World Trade Organization commitments. Specifically, the administration should look into China’s requirement for offsets in exchange for market access and government policies that favor domestic aviation manufacturing firms over foreign ones. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: Developments in China’s Commercial and Military Aviation Industry)

The Commission recommends that Congress should review with the Department of Justice whether or not any U.S. antitrust laws, rules, and regulations impede cooperation within the aircraft manufacturing industry to resist Chinese offset demands, and should legally authorize such cooperation, if necessary. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: Developments in China’s Commercial and Military Aviation Industry)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to closely monitor the transfer of technology and know-how from China’s commercial aviation sector to its military aviation sector. Such monitoring should examine what impact new cooperative production, technology-sharing or other arrangements by U.S. or foreign firms might have in promoting the development of China’s indigenous civilian and/or military aviation production capabilities. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: Developments in China’s Commercial and Military Aviation Industry)

The Commission recommends that Congress hold hearings to assess administration efforts to accelerate the certification by the Federal Aviation Administration of Chinese indigenously produced aircraft and what impact that may have on the sale of U.S. aircraft. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: Developments in China’s Commercial and Military Aviation Industry)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to continue to increase its engagement with Southeast Asia diplomatically, economically, and militarily. Congress should also press the administration to commit to annual U.S.- ASEAN summits and, when possible, commit the President of the United States to travel to Southeast Asia to attend the meetings. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Southeast Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to move quickly in appointing a new U.S. ambassador to ASEAN. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Southeast Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to press Beijing to make more transparent its planned construction of hydropower dams along the Mekong River. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Southeast Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress require the U.S. Department of Agriculture and other relevant government agencies to submit a report detailing the impact that Chinese hydroelectric dams along the Mekong River could potentially have on the global food supply. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Southeast Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to support the improving relationship between Taiwan and China. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to identify ways to strengthen economic relations between the United States and Taiwan in order to improve Taiwan’s position in further economic negotiations with the mainland. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress pass a joint resolution reaffirming the importance of, and continued U.S. commitment to, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to encourage the People’s Republic of China to build up the improved cross-Strait relationship by renouncing the use of force in regard to resolving its dispute with Taiwan. Beijing should also be encouraged to demonstrate its good intentions by drawing down the number of short-range ballistic missile forces deployed against Taiwan. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to work with Taiwan to modernize its armed forces, with particular emphasis on its air defense needs. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong and that Congress encourage senior administration officials, including the secretary of State, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 3: Hong Kong)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage its Members to raise the issue of preserving Hong Kong’s special status when meeting with members of China’s National People’s Congress. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 3: Hong Kong)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to seek from China more accurate reporting of its energy use and the resulting environmental effects, including its carbon dioxide emissions. The Commission further recommends that Congress encourage the administration to enhance cooperation with China to more effectively collect this information. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 1: China’s Environmental and Green Energy Policies)

The Commission recommends that Congress identify and assess the benefits and disadvantages of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the United States and China on green energy and the environment. In its assessment, Congress should examine whether the intellectual property rights of U.S. companies are being protected. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 1: China’s Environmental and Green Energy Policies)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to work with the United Nations to revise its classification of China as a developing country. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 1: China’s Environmental and Green Energy Policies)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to include U.S. friends and allies in the developing world in its discussions with China on its clean energy and climate change policies. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 1: China’s Environmental and Green Energy Policies)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to continue to press China to ensure that China’s market is open to imported green technology products, including solar, wind, and battery products. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 2: U.S. and Chinese Efforts to Promote Alternative Energy Manufacturing)

The Commission recommends that Congress assess differing policies in the United States and China on trade and tariffs in the green technology sector with an aim to maximize U.S. competitiveness. (Chapter 4: China’s Green Energy Policies and Efforts to Promote the Alternative Energy Sector, Section 2: U.S. and Chinese Efforts to Promote Alternative Energy Manufacturing)

The Commission recommends that Congress and the administration continue to raise censorship and Internet freedom as a priority in their exchanges with Chinese officials. (Chapter 5: China and the Internet, Section 1: China’s Domestic Internet Censorship Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress assess the effectiveness of U.S.-sponsored programs, such as those that promote international broadcasting and Internet censorship circumvention, intended to facilitate uncensored communication between Americans and people in China. (Chapter 5: China and the Internet, Section 1: China’s Domestic Internet Censorship Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to pursue in international fora better protections of information on the Internet in order to facilitate trade. (Chapter 5: China and the Internet, Section 1: China’s Domestic Internet Censorship Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress assess the effectiveness of existing mechanisms that enable the private sector to report confidentially instances of serious malicious activity targeting their information systems. Congress should also work with the administration to assess whether Department of Defense initiatives implemented in the past year to better secure their information systems might serve as a model for how to secure information systems at other large federal agencies. If so, Congress should ensure that similar initiatives are appropriately resourced. (Chapter 5: China and the Internet, Section 2: External Implications of China’s Internet-Related Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to help U.S. companies resist attempts by Chinese authorities to mandate or coerce foreign high-technology firms to reveal sensitive product information as a quid pro quo for market access in China. (Chapter 5: China and the Internet, Section 2: External Implications of China’s Internet-Related Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress adopt legislation mandating that the Securities and Exchange Commission retain analysts with country-specific expertise to review filings from foreign companies, particularly Chinese companies. (Chapter 6: Information Controls)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to strengthen its oversight of China’s compliance with the rulings of the WTO’s dispute settlement panels. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2009)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the USTR, as part of its annual National Trade Estimates report, to identify and prioritize for elimination barriers in China limiting the export of U.S. goods and services. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2009)

The Commission recommends that Congress undertake oversight of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue to ensure that the talks benefit American farmers, workers, and businesses. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2009)

The Commission recommends that Congress direct the U.S. Department of the Treasury to report annually on the status of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency. This report should highlight actions, if any, taken during the reporting period by China and other nations that may contribute to the erosion of this status. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship’s Current Status and Significant Changes During 2009)

The Commission recommends that Congress pass legislation urging the administration to report specifically on information regarding Chinese-sourced products and services used in U.S. federally funded stimulus programs and make this information available to the public on a periodic basis. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 2: China’s Role in the Origins of the Global Financial Crisis and China’s Response)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to employ more aggressively trade remedies to counteract the Chinese government’s subsidies to favored industries. The Commission further recommends that Congress assess the adequacy of the resources of the U.S. Department of Commerce to investigate such subsidies. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the National Science Foundation to study and recommend to Congress ways to enhance the effectiveness of basic and applied research programs in the United States, with particular emphasis on advancing the competitiveness of key domestic production sectors. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the U.S. Department of Commerce to prepare an annual report on productive capacity in China in major industrial sectors. The report should identify what steps, if any, China has taken to develop, expand, retract, or change the utilization of capacity in these sectors over the previous years. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the U.S. Department of Commerce to develop rules and procedures for the collection and evaluation of information on the activities of U.S. companies in terms of their sourcing arrangements with producers (whether independent, joint venture, subsidiary, or other relationship) in China, to the extent authorized by law. The U.S. Department of Commerce shall prepare an annual report, based on this information, identifying changing sourcing patterns and key areas of interest and concern. This information should be subject to business proprietary confidentiality and only utilized in the report, to the extent practicable, on an aggregate basis. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 3: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy)

The Commission recommends that Congress explore the economic benefits to local communities of a national innovation strategy to meet the challenges of China’s industrial policy. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on Upstate New York)

The Commission recommends that Congress request the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on the impact of outsourcing of manufacturing on U.S. domestic research, development, and innovation. (Chapter 1: The U.S.-China Trade and Economic Relationship, Section 4: China’s Industrial Policy and its Impact on Upstate New York)

The Commission recommends that Congress make freedom of navigation a priority issue in its U.S.-China interparliamentary exchanges. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad)

The Commission recommends Congress urge the administration to encourage further People’s Liberation Army (PLA) participation in United Nations (UN) multinational security operations. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad)

To emphasize continued U.S. commitments to and interests in the region, the Commission recommends that Congress encourage the U.S. Department of Defense to maintain and strengthen military diplomacy with nations throughout East Asia. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 1: China’s Military and Security Activities Abroad)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress in their interparliamentary exchanges encourage Beijing to increase the transparency of its naval modernization efforts. Of particular interest are China’s aircraft carrier, antiship ballistic missile, and ballistic missile submarine programs, as well as its naval expansion and modernization efforts. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Naval Modernization)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the U.S. Department of Defense to continue to interact actively with U.S. allies and friends in Asia to reassure them of the U.S.’s commitment to the region. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Naval Modernization)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to push for more engagement between the U.S. Navy and the PLA Navy as a confidence-building measure. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Naval Modernization)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to consider establishing a formal mechanism for preventing and managing maritime incidents between the U.S. and Chinese navies. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 2: China’s Naval Modernization)

The Commission recommends that Congress assess the adequacy of resources available for China-oriented counterintelligence awareness and law enforcement programs throughout the U.S. government and contractor community. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: China’s Human Espionage Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress in their interparliamentary exchanges raise U.S. concerns regarding the monitoring and harassment of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents by agents of the Chinese government. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 3: China’s Human Espionage Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to develop measures to deter malicious Chinese cyber activity that is directed at critical U.S. infrastructure and U.S. government information systems. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests, Section 4: China’s Cyber Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security)
 

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to work with China to utilize its influence with Islamabad to bolster Pakistan’s stability and prevent the Taliban from gaining control of the region. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to examine carefully development programs and investment opportunities in Afghanistan and work with U.S. private businesses interested in investing there to ensure that they are able to compete effectively with Chinese state-owned companies. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 1: China in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to support recent improvements in the cross-Strait relationship. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to identify opportunities to strengthen bilateral economic relations between the United States and Taiwan. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to work with Taiwan to modernize its armed forces, with particular emphasis on air defense needs. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Taiwan)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong and that Congress encourage senior administration officials, including the secretary of State, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel. The Commission also recommends that Members of Congress seek dialogue with members of the Legislative Council of Hong Kong. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Hong Kong)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage its Members to raise the issue of preserving Hong Kong’s special status when meeting with members of China’s National People’s Congress. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Hong Kong)

The Commission recommends that Congress reenact the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which expired in 2007. (Chapter 3: China in Asia, Section 2: Hong Kong)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress in their interparliamentary exchanges continue to raise concerns regarding freedom of expression in China in their dialogues with officials of the Chinese government. (Chapter 4: China’s Media and Information Controls—The Impact in China and the United States, Section 1: Freedom of Expression in China)

The Commission recommends that Congress continue to monitor and assess the Chinese government’s efforts to implement an end-user Internet control system. The Commission further recommends that Congress assess whether such efforts are compliant with China’s commitments as a signatory to the World Trade Organization. (Chapter 4: China’s Media and Information Controls—The Impact in China and the United States, Section 1: Freedom of Expression in China)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to have the U.S. Department of State raise with its counterparts in the PRC Foreign Ministry concerns related to the denial of visas to U.S. academics who require travel to China in order to engage in substantive research. (Chapter 4: China’s Media and Information Controls—The Impact in China and the United States, Section 2: China’s External Propaganda and Influence Operations, and the Resulting Impacts on the United States)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to monitor the implementation and enforcement of China’s updated antimonopoly and patent laws to ensure that they are consistent with its WTO commitments and do not discriminate against foreign suppliers. In particular, the Chinese laws should not be used to shield state-owned enterprises from equal enforcement of the laws, in compliance with China’s WTO commitments. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress direct the president to establish an interagency task force made up of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and other appropriate government agencies to identify and address the unique national security and economic challenges created by the lack of transparency and political character of China’s sovereign wealth funds and government controlled companies. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress revive the Office of Technology Assessment, which for 23 years advised Congress on the social, economic, and environmental consequences of technology. The office should be reopened with the mission of advising Congress on technology policy and related issues, with specific attention to Chinese actions that affect U.S. technology interests. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress prevent further cuts in information and statistical analysis by the chief economic departments and agencies of the executive branch and encourage the administration to improve its collection of information about China’s impact on globalization. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress authorize the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the FDA to test imported fish for any contaminants typically found in polluted waters, such as mercury, and to expand funding for research into the potential harm to consumers of fish contaminated with the antibiotics, pesticides, and industrial wastes typically found in unregulated Chinese aquaculture operations. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress revise the Country of Origin Labeling regulations on fish to place the program under the jurisdiction of the FDA rather than the U.S. Department of Agriculture and to remove from the law’s provisions loopholes that exempt much of the fish sold in fish markets. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress authorize the expansion of the NOAA’s fish inspection and certification program. By expanding this voluntary, fee-based system for imported fish, Congress could enable consumers to be better informed, while encouraging American fish importers to follow the highest health and safety practices for their products—at little or no cost to taxpayers. NOAA’s inspection and certification program approximates the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s meat and poultry program. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress pass legislation to enhance the authority of the Customs and Border Protection agency of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to collect penalty tariffs in antidumping cases. Exporters in China have been able to circumvent such duties by transshipping through third countries not covered by antidumping orders, while importers have used a variety of means to escape paying the duties. (Chapter 1: The United States-China Trade and Economic Relationship)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to seek dialogue on civil nuclear security and to cooperate with China to ensure that its rapid expansion of civil nuclear power does not result in a decline in safety standards or lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons expertise, technology, or related materials. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests)

In order to prevent the proliferation of weapons technology, the Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to enhance its cooperation with China in strengthening export control and border control programs and in improving the capacity of Chinese officials to implement those programs. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress during interparliamentary exchanges with their counterpart members of China’s National People’s Congress reiterate the commitments that China has made as a party to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to engage in consultations with its allies on an alliance based approach to dealing with cyber attacks originating in China. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to engage China in a military dialogue on its actions and programs in cyber and space warfare, including threat reduction mechanisms, transparency initiatives, and international laws of conflict as they apply to the cyber and space domains. (Chapter 2: China’s Activities Directly Affecting U.S. Security Interests)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to monitor the transboundary environmental impacts of China’s energy consumption and to report on the effects of China’s air pollution on air quality in the United States. (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to seek from China more complete reporting of the economic and environmental effects of China’s energy use and to enhance cooperation with China in collecting information about those effects, especially in collecting data on China’s carbon dioxide emissions. (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)
 

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to implement fully the goals of the 10-year energy and environmental cooperation framework that was signed with China during the fourth meeting of the Strategic Economic Dialogue in June 2008. (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to seek greater opportunities for public-private cooperation in the development and deployment of clean coal technology and carbon capture and sequestration technology in the United States and in China. (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to establish a bilateral dialogue with China to discuss strategies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, especially from coal-fired power plants, and to mitigate the effects of climate change.  (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to work with China toward a mutually acceptable multilateral solution for adoption in international climate change negotiations. (Chapter 3: China’s Energy and Environment Policies and Activities)

The Commission recommends that Congress support the administration’s efforts to pursue a dialogue with China on international aid and investment in the developing world and urge the administration to seek agreement from China on implementing transparent policies and practices for foreign development assistance. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to take additional steps to discourage arms sales by China to countries and regimes of concern and to sanction governments, companies, and individuals that permit the weapons they sold or purchased to be retransferred to state or nonstate actors engaged in military conflicts with U.S. forces or the forces of friends and allies. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage the administration to continue to work with Taiwan to modernize its armed forces. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to continue to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations in which de jure statehood is not a prerequisite for participation, and to push energetically for arrangements that permit Taiwan to participate meaningfully in the activities of other international organizations including the specialized agencies of the United Nations, and for the World Health Organization/World Health Assembly to grant Taiwan official observer status. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to encourage Japan and China to settle their territorial disputes peacefully. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress urge the administration to negotiate an agreement with Japan to share information about contaminated and unsafe food and products exported from China. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress direct the administration to establish a formal dialogue with the government of South Korea regarding technology transfers or losses to China that might affect national security. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress, when visiting mainland China, also visit Hong Kong and that Congress encourage senior administration officials, including the secretary of State, to make visits to Hong Kong part of their travel to China. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress reenact the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, which expired in 2007. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Congress encourage its Members to seek opportunities for dialogue with members of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)

The Commission recommends that Members of Congress, in their meetings and dialogues with members of China’s National People’s Congress, raise the importance of the development in Hong Kong of an electoral system with universal suffrage. (Chapter 4: China’s Foreign Activities and Relationships)