Vice-Chairman Bartholomew, Senator Talent, and members of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing.

A central component in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic and foreign policy toolkit is the “United Front” (統一戰線). This “mysterious” whole-of-society strategy, which engages all aspects of society, integrates party-state organizations under CCP-rule in a comprehensive stratagem that aims to control, indoctrinate, and mobilize non-CCP masses—both native and foreign—in service of the Party’s policy objectives. The system that executes this political warfare strategy has been traditionally composed of multiple party, military, and state organizations, but this system has undergone centralization in recent years with the establishment of the CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Group on United Front (中央統戰工作領導小組), and updated in the recent re-organization of several State Council departments responsible for overseas Chinese, religious, and ethnic minority affairs under the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD).

The most well-known and successful United Front campaigns in CCP history are the ones with the Nationalist Party (KMT, Kuomintang). In alliances forged out of necessity, the KMT and CCP formally united forces at least twice to resist their common enemies prior to the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949: first to expel imperialists and warlords in China then to resist the Japanese invasion during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Yet, the CCP’s United Fronts were not limited to collaboration with the KMT. To be sure, it was also a tool that the CCP skillfully used to undermine KMT-rule on China leading up to and during the Chinese civil war. After 1949, the CCP turned the focus of its United Front activities towards subverting the Nationalist government’s control of Taiwan. When Taiwan democratized from the 1980s, the focus of United Front began to shift to subverting Taiwan’s democratic system, which Beijing viewed as a threat to its ultimate objective of subjugating Taiwan under the PRC.

The United Front draws from the Bolshevik’s playbook in the 1917 Russian Revolution by forming strategic alliances with non-communist masses against a common enemy. From the 1920s, CCP strategists adapted these concepts to organize and mobilize non-CCP masses in

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1 The views expressed in this paper only represent the author’s opinions and not necessarily that of his affiliated organizations.
3 https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/magicweaponsanne-mariebradyseptember162017.pdf
support of its political objectives. Considering the successes of these earlier efforts, the CCP formed the United Front Work Commission in 1939 (中央統一戰線委員會) and in the same year established the Organization of United Front Work Department (組織中央統一戰線部).

United Front is a tool for political warfare that involves the use of non-kinetic instruments to organize and mobilize non-CCP masses in pursuit of the Party’s domestic and foreign policy objectives. According to a declassified study conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency, United Front is a “technique for controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-Communist masses.” Since the CCP was founded in 1921, the Party has used United Front as an organizing principle to establish a foothold among the masses, exploiting conflicts within society to undermine the influence of its adversaries, defeat warlords, gain support of the victims of Japanese aggression, and aid in the seizure of state power. After forming the PRC government in 1949, the CCP has employed the United Front to extend its control over non-Communist masses and to mobilize these masses to shore up its domestic legitimacy and undermine threats to state security. According to Anne Marie-Brady: “United Front activities incorporates working with groups and prominent individuals in society; information management and propaganda; and it has also frequently been a means of facilitating espionage.”

Though United Front is traditionally understood in the context of KMT-CCP relations, CCP General Secretary and PRC President Xi Jinping gave a speech in 2014 on the importance of United Front work, calling it one of the CCP’s “magic weapons” (法宝). While Taiwan remains the primary target of United Front work because unification remains one of the core issues for CCP leaders, the targets of CCP United Front work have increased as the CCP’s interests expanded with the rise of the PRC. As highlighted by numerous academic studies, the CCP’s “attempts to guide, buy, or coerce political influence abroad” are now also affecting countries like Australia, New Zealand, and other states in Europe.

In 2015, the CCP issued a significant trial regulation on CCP United Front Work (中國共產黨統一戰線工作條例(試行)). This document is the first official regulation that comprehensively governs CCP United Front work and, more importantly, seeks to institutionalize, standardize, and establish procedures regulating United Front work.

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4 http://zytzb.gov.cn/tzb2010/stwb/201606/75f0ae6e9e66482eb6c8f6587e62e230.shtml
7 https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
9 2014年9月，庆祝中国人民政治协商会议成立65周年大会上，习近平发表重要讲话：“大团结大联合是统一战线的本质要求”，“统一战线是中国共产党夺取革命、建设、改革事业胜利的重要法宝，也是实现中华民族伟大复兴的重要法宝”，“我们要坚持有事多商量，遇事多商量，做事多商量，商量得越多越深入越好，推进社会主义协商民主广泛多层制度化发展”。(See, i.e., http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0731/c385474-27391395.html)
11 https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/005a240353dc4ff9acd8efc83e571b67/Section_file/9895520f99394c66b17f762893913d01.pdf
Explicitly linking the unification of Taiwan to the goal of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (中華民族偉大復興) and the “China dream” (中國夢), Article 30 of the Regulation highlights that the main task of United Front towards Taiwan as: "Following the principle of the Central Government's guidance on Taiwan, adhering to the one-China principle (一個中國原則), opposing the separatist activities of Taiwan's independence, and broadly unite Taiwan compatriots, consolidate the political, economic, cultural, and social foundations for deepening the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, and complete the great cause of the motherland’s unification in the process of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation."12 Additionally, Article 31 on the tasks of overseas United Front operations refers to “promoting global anti-independence and pro-unification” activities, and Article 32 seeks the support of “democratic” parties and non-partisan individuals to guide relevant Unified Front groups such as teams such as the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (中國和平統一促進會) and the China Overseas Friendship Association (海外聯誼會).13

What are China’s objectives in its relations with Taiwan, and what are the long-term implications of China’s strategic goals in the region?

Given the history of the Chinese civil war and the strategic importance of the Taiwan issue for CCP leaders, Taiwan remains the United Front’s number one priority. The objective of the CCP in its relations with Taiwan shifted from the subversion of Nationalist government rule over the island and remnants of sympathetic elements in China to the subjugation of Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) under the People’s Republic China (PRC) after 1979 when the United States switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing.

Between 1949 and 1979, the PRC and the ROC governments were engaged in an intense competition for international diplomatic recognition as the legal representative of “China” in the international community. The two sides fought several skirmishes and twice nearly got into an all-out conflict—one with the United States threatening a nuclear war against China to protect Taiwan in 1955.

When the PRC took the ROC’s seats in the United Nations in 1971 and the UN recognized Beijing as "the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations," Beijing’s objectives in relations with Taiwan evolved into the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC under “One Country, Two Systems” (一國兩制). The formula—which was rejected by the Nationalist government—was then applied to Hong Kong and remains the blueprint of the CCP’s cross-Strait policy since it was first proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.14

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12 第三十条 对台统一战线工作的主要任务是：贯彻执行中央对台工作大政方针，坚持一个中国原则，反对“台独”分裂活动，广泛团结台湾同胞，巩固深化两岸关系和平发展的政治、经济、文化、社会基础，在实现中华民族伟大复兴进程中完成祖国统一大业。（See, e.g., http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/0923/c64107-27622040.html)
13 https://www.mjib.gov.tw/FileUploads/eBooks/005a240353dc4ff9acd8efc83e571b67/Section_file/9895520f99394c6b6717762893913d01.pdf
Taiwan’s eventual absorption by the PRC following the switch in diplomatic recognition was considered only a matter of time for many senior policymakers in the US government. However, at the time of normalization the PRC was still weak and the implications of Taiwan’s eventual unification with the PRC did not weigh heavily in the assessment of the long-term challenges of China’s strategic goals in the region. In 1989, Deng laid out his strategy of *Tao Guang Yang Hui* (韬光养晦)—translated as "hide our capabilities and bide our time”—which was fully in effect as the guiding principle of its foreign policy for two decades. As the author of the *The Hundred-Year Marathon*, Michael Pillsbury wrote: “In 1991, China’s leaders secretly used a Warring States proverb, tao guang, yang hui. When the document containing this phrase leaked, Beijing translated it as the cryptic and generic “bide your time, build your capabilities.” But in its proper context, the proverb actually alludes to overturning the old hegemon and exacting revenge, but only once the rising power has developed the ability to do so.”

At the same time, the CCP was facing an existential ideological crisis. A decade after Deng initiated sweeping economic reforms that changed the character of the Chinese political-economy, followed by the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989, the CCP was faced with the demise of its ideological brethren in the Soviet Union, which weakened the political legitimacy of communist rule. Consequently, the leadership turned to nationalism to bolster its legitimacy at home and abroad. According to University of Miami Professor June Teufel Dreyer: “As part of this outreach, it became more interested in cultivating overseas Chinese communities and mobilizing them in support of PRC goals. With more and more young Chinese choosing to study abroad, Chinese student associations proliferated and could be mobilized to support the party’s policies. Non-Chinese, particularly those who enjoyed positions of respect in their communities and varying amounts of wealth, were sought out as well, earning the honorary title of “Friends of China.””

The rally around Chinese nationalism is neither empty rhetoric nor without cause. From 1980 to 2016, China’s GDP grew from $191 billion to about $11 trillion. While the Chinese defense budget, as part of overall defense budget, stagnated in the 1980s and the early 1990s even as economic reforms increased China’s overall wealth; beginning in 1996, China’s defense budget grew by double digits year on year from 1996 to 2016. In 2018, China announced that it was increasing the military budget by 8.1% over the previous year.

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15 One of the United States’ primary motivation to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC was to shore up China’s weaknesses, which it saw as a grave threat to Soviet encroachment.


17 https://books.google.com/books?id=grGMAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT37&lpg=PT37&dq=The+Hundred-Year+Marathon+tao+guang+yang+hui&source=bl&ots=Lkc-sU2r1u&sig=btcyzquV5Z24JZzfL-khmOSIZae&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjStsXjtobaAhUM-aQKHVXEDcoQ6AEIRjAE#v=onepage&q=The%20Hundred-Year%20Marathon%20tao%20guang%20yang%20hui&f=false

18 https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-without-war-chinas-united-front-strategy/

19 https://data.worldbank.org/country/china

20 https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/budget.htm


No longer hiding its strength or biding its time, at the quintennial 19th CCP Congress held in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping promised that the CCP will achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and restore China to its rightful great power status by 2049—the centennial of the PRC’s founding.23 Xi emphatically declared:

“We firmly believe that as long as all sons and daughters of China, including compatriots from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan . . . firmly grasp hold of the destiny of the nation in our own hands, we will be able to joint create a beautiful future of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”24

Xi’s declaration tied the unification of Taiwan with the ultimate goal of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”25 and incorporated Taiwan into the “China dream.” Within the military sphere, Xi proposed that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would complete mechanization by 2020, modernization by 2035 and would evolve into “a world-class army by 2050.”26 The unification of Taiwan is the prerequisite for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. While there is no doubt that Beijing seeks regional hegemony in the near-term, according to Pillsbury, China’s secret strategy is to supplant the United States as the world’s dominant power, and to do so by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC.27

How does Beijing employ and integrate various instruments of its national power, including the United Front Work Department (UFWD), to influence Taiwan?

The PLA is engaged in a substantial and sustained two decades-long unprecedented modernization campaign. This is an ever-present danger for Taiwan—some assessments of this threat paint it as more imminent than others.28 Beijing is also utilizing hybrid warfare29—actions that operate in the gray zone30 of conflict and fall beneath the level of warfare—to both influence and pressure Taiwan from within and externally. And the crushing weight of that influence will only become more coercive as China raises. In fact, these non-military instruments possess the most coercive potential against Taiwan and is perhaps the most immediate in terms of its impact felt on Taiwan. This type of warfare employs multiple instruments of power and influence, with an emphasis on non-military tools, to pursue its national interests. These non-military tools include but are not limited to: information operations such as propaganda and disinformation, proxies, economic coercion, clandestine measures and political influence.31

29 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf
30 https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/14/hybrid-warfare-aggression-and-coercion-gray-zone
31 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf
Since the election of Tsai Ing-wen as president of Taiwan in January 2016, China has stepped up its diplomatic offensive against the country’s international and diplomatic space. Taiwan now only has 20 diplomatic allies around the world compared to 23 when Tsai was elected president. The continued bleeding of diplomatic allies could lead to lower public confidence and morale on Taiwan. The PRC is also using its considerable economic power as leverage to demand multinational companies to comply with its political interpretations of Taiwan’s legal status and therefore influence the people’s understanding about Taiwan and its relationship with the PRC.32

Beijing is also utilizing international organizations that it wields influence over such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and INTERPOL for its political objectives in cross-Strait relations. In the case of flight route M-503 and excluding Taiwan from international bodies even where statehood is not a requirement are to demonstrate that Taiwan is the sole jurisdiction of the PRC. Such practices are likely intended to shape normative understanding of Taiwan’s status whose long-term effect may be to effect a legal change in the “status quo.”33 As a democracy, public opinions matter and can influence policy and there is an undercurrent of activities that also influence the domestic conditions on Taiwan under which cross-Strait relations operate: CCP’s United Fronts.34

United Fronts

Guided by the doctrinal principle of “uniting with friends and disintegrating enemies,” United Front and political work in general adopts tactics similar to, but not the same, as the Soviet Union’s “active measures”35 to promote the CCP’s interests. The type of political warfare employs strategic psychological operations as a means of affecting public discourse and influencing policies of friends and foes alike. Propaganda, carried out both during peacetime and in armed conflict, amplifies or attenuates the political effects of the military instrument of national power.36 Political warfare employs coercive persuasion to weaken an opponent’s political will and compel a course of action favorable to one’s own interests. Policymakers—both civilian and military—are influenced through perceptions and psychological conditioning, and thinking may be affected by the words and actions of a potential adversary.37

Political warfare should be distinguished from public diplomacy. Put simply, public diplomacy is international political advocacy carried out in a transparent manner through routine media channels and public engagements. Political warfare differs from public diplomacy in terms of target and intent. While public diplomacy seeks to influence opinions of mass audiences, political warfare involves a calculated manipulation of an opposing side’s strategies, defense policies, and broader international norms.38

34 https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf (UFWD also plays a role in providing guidance to the Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban), which manages Confucian Institutes around the world.)
35 https://www.cia.gov/library/readigroom/docs/CIA-RDP84B00049R001303150031-0.pdf
36 http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
37 http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
38 http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
**First Phase: Chinese Civil War**

*First United Front (1924-1927) & Second United Front (1936-1941)*

With pressure from the COMINTERN, the first United Front between the KMT and the CCP began in 1924 and ended in 1927. The objectives of the first United Front were to combat colonialists and warlords, the common enemies of both parties even though the two organizations held diametrically opposed ideological views. All the while, however, United Front was also used by the CCP to undermine support for the much-stronger KMT. The second United Front between the KMT and the CCP was initiated in 1936 to fight against the Japanese invasion during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and ended in 1941. The two occasions upon which the parties united belie the deep-seated mistrust and even hatred held by its leaders toward the other. As noted by Dreyer: “The early history of united front work in China was not a happy one: ordered by the Communist International to ally with the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) on two separate occasions, the infant Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found that the KMT, too, was capable of squeezing and discarding; many CCP members, including Mao Zedong’s wife, were executed in what became known as the White Terror.”

**Second Phase: Post-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with US**

*Third United Front (1979 – 2004)*

The Third United Front was officially launched in 1979 by the late Chinese patriarch Deng Xiaoping. After Beijing succeeded in getting the United States to normalize relations with the PRC in January 1979 and broke official ties with Taipei, Deng announced preparations for a “Third CCP-KMT United Front” on December 15 that year. This granted the UFWD, which had been relatively dormant, a formal and prominent role in cross-Strait policy within the party-state policymaking bureaucracy.

The CCP, also in 1979, passed a special measure to “influence politics through trade” (以商养政). In conjunction with Deng’s transformative economic plan of “reform and opening-up” (改革开放) launched in December 1978, “Article 1 of the temporary provisions on the development of trade relations with Taiwan promulgated in May 1979 states that the purpose of trade with

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39 Communist International (COMINTERN), also known as the Third International, is an international Communist organization established in 1919 and controlled by the Soviet Union, whose stated intent is to promote unity and support to communist movements worldwide. (See, e.g., https://www.britannica.com/topic/Third-International).

40 https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-without-war-chinas-united-front-strategy/

41 See You Ji and Daniel Alderman, “Changing Civil-Military Relations in China,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (eds), The PLA at Home And Abroad: Assessing The Operational Capabilities Of China’s Military, pp. 166-167.

42 https://books.google.com/books?id=jKSKcwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=%22Third+CCP-KMT+United+Front%22&source=bl&ots=L77mYxZcOi&sig=OmFfKjSNUOUEZJ6zEgQBHJFJs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=ahUKEwjojpyr74paAhXNcAtKHVZqBhEjAEG6AEOjgA#v=onepage&q=%22Third%20CCP-KMT%20United%20Front%22&f=false
Taiwan is to win and consolidate the support of the industrialists and business people in Taiwan, and to create the conditions for the reunification [sic] of the motherland.”

The CCP’s Taiwan policy after normalization of ties with the United States was set out in the Nine Points made by veteran Marshal Ye Jianying on September 30, 1981. Ye called for unification talks between the CCP and KMT on an equal footing, initiation of cross-Strait trade and other functional exchanges, and consultative positions for representatives from Taiwan. Beyond subordinating Taiwan as a local area under central CCP authority, Ye’s nine-point proposal was viewed as targeting U.S. security support for Taiwan. Taipei rejected the “One Country, Two Systems” proposal, and called for unification under a democratic, free, and non-communist system.

As part of the CCP’s broader United Front efforts, the All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (ACFTC, 中華全國台灣同胞聯誼會) was established on December 22, 1981. The All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots promotes unification among Taiwanese individuals and groups in China and abroad. ACFTC, the PLA’s General Political Department, and the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) have cooperated on Taiwan-related propaganda efforts since 2002.

The 1980s was a decade full of turbulence and profound change, the political conditions in Taiwan transformed rapidly with the lifting of martial law and the formation of the now ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In 1990, after liberalization of cross-Strait trade, China rolled out the red carpets to lure Taiwanese capital and investments by providing incentives and preferential treatments for businesspeople to set up shop in China. Cross-Strait economic ties boomed. The 2000 presidential election in Taiwan saw the victory of the native DPP in the first peaceful transfer of power. At first the CCP took a wait and see approach. A very different political party and origin from the KMT, relationship between the CCP and the DPP quickly soured for the former’s unwillingness to work with the new party and the latter’s pro-independence inclinations. Cross-Strait relations entered into an uncharted territory.

**Third Phase: China’s Rise and Taiwan’s Democratization**

*Fourth United Front (2004 - 2014)*

After the first administration of the DPP (2000-2004) and the party won a second-term, the CCP ramped up its United Front efforts against Taiwan. As Professor Dreyer observed: … “in 2005, Wang Huning, then-director of the CCP’s Central Party Research Office and now a Politburo member, targeted more than 20 political figures from Taiwan’s Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who had been marginalized by their respective parties and invited them to serve as organizing central committee members of a new, pro-Beijing, party …

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43 https://books.google.com/books?id=jKSKCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=%22Third+CCP-KMT+United+Front%22&source=bl&ots=L7TmYxZcOi&sig=OmFfKjSNUOUEFZN6zEQRgBHjFJs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjprty_j4PaAhXNet8KHVZqBhEQ6AEIOjAE#v=onepage&q=%22Third%20CCP-KMT%20United%20Front%22&f=false
44 http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
45 http://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf
in June 2008 the Politburo had passed a political strategy for settling the Taiwan issue that listed organizing a political party in Taiwan as its most important united front tactic.\textsuperscript{46}

In a significant coup for CCP United Front—especially considering Marshal Ye’s long unheeded call from over two decades before in 1981—on March 28, 2005, then KMT’s vice chairman Chiang Pin-kung led a delegation in the first official visit to the PRC by a senior leader of the KMT since 1949.\textsuperscript{47} Later, on April 26, 2005, a 70-member delegation led by then KMT chairman Lien Chan traveled to the ROC’s \textit{de jure} capital of Nanjing, launching Lien’s 8-day Taiwan Strait peace tour.\textsuperscript{48} The two parties established the First KMT-CCP Forum (國共論壇), which has been held annually since 2006, and issued a joint communiqué to oppose Taiwan’s independence and promote Taiwan’s eventual unification with China.\textsuperscript{49}

When the KMT returned to power on Taiwan in 2008. CCP United Front activities became more institutionalized. For instance, an annual cross-Strait dialogue called the “Zhongshan, Whampoa, and Cross-Strait Friendship” dialogue (中山黃埔兩岸情論壇) was started in 2010 by the PRC’s Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang Central Committee (中國國民黨革命委員會) and the Whampoa Military Academy Alumni Association (黃埔軍校同學會). The Straits Forum (海峽論壇), which also began in 2009, has attracted the largest congregation of private citizens at a single event from both sides of the Taiwan Strait to promote cross-Strait dialogue. The 9th Straits Forum held in 2017 was reportedly attended by 8,000 participants from Taiwan. Another high-level “non-governmental” exchange platform that began around 2008 is the Cross-Strait CEO Summit (兩岸企業家峰會).\textsuperscript{50} The Zhongshan, Whampoa, and Cross-Strait Friendship dialogue, Straits Forum, and Cross-Strait CEO Summit are only three of many cross-Strait platforms at the provincial and local levels launched after 2008 when exchanges between the two sides began to expand in number and accelerate in intensity. At the time, the CCP's United Front work against Taiwan focused on the political and business elites.\textsuperscript{51} The aggregate effect of these efforts culminated in the summit meeting between KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping in November 2015 in Singapore.

\textit{Fourth Phase: Post-2014 Sunflower Movement}

\textit{Fifth United Front (2014 – current)}

The current phase of CCP United Front began in 2014. The turning point was the student-led Sunflower Movement on Taiwan in the spring of 2014 that not only shook the political

\textsuperscript{46} https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-without-war-chinas-united-front-strategy/ (“In late 2017, investigators searched the residences of four prominent members of the New Party. The party, which espouses policies that echo those of the CCP, is legitimate under Taiwan law. The content of the materials seized in the raid has not been disclosed, but it has been alleged that the New Party had founded a paramilitary New China Youth Association with the goal of “wartime control.””)

\textsuperscript{47} In 1992, the two sides met in Hong Kong through the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).

\textsuperscript{48} http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042600406.html

\textsuperscript{49} http://globaltaiwan.org/2016/11/09-gtb-1-8/

\textsuperscript{50} http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/07/05-gtb-2-27/#RH070517

\textsuperscript{51} http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1119634
establishment of the then ruling-KMT but it caused a rethink in Beijing’s approach to United Front work against Taiwan. Then Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) director Zhang Zhijun postponed a visit to Taiwan and decided to bypass the central government in arranging his itineraries ostensibly to connect more with the grassroots of Taiwan. And to bring this turning point into sharper focus, the student protests were followed by a sweeping of the KMT by the DPP in the local “nine-in-one” elections.

To be sure, teacher-student exchanges had been a common feature in CCP United Front activities across the Taiwan Strait, but the Sunflower movement made Chinese leaders realize how “Taiwan’s youth” identified themselves may be the biggest problem facing its objectives of United Front. As a result, CCP United Front shifted from a “passive” to a more “active” policy of offering preferential policies, and gradually expanding its policy of attracting Taiwan’s youth to go to China for “schooling, employment, and entrepreneurship.”52 The State Council’s TAO reportedly established 53 cross-strait youth employment and business and demonstration bases,53 and has granted PRC-issued Taiwan travel permit holders (台胞証) special privileges when traveling in China, and permit Taiwan researchers to apply for PRC state-funded social sciences funds and housing bonds.

In 2016, the DPP won the presidential and legislative elections. Immediately after the new administration took office, the CCP suspended high-level contact with the new government and bolstered its United Front activities directed at Taiwan. Indeed, Beijing discovered that the high-level exchanges with Taiwan’s government and business under Ma Ying-jeou did not win the hearts of the Taiwanese people. Thereafter, the CCP shifted the focus of its United Front strategy to targeting small and medium enterprises, middle to low income people, and the central and southern regions, and Taiwan’s youth (三中一青), while isolating DPP-administered counties and cities.54 In 2017, the approach was expanded to include younger generations and more grassroots (一代一線), which extended the previous targets of United Front to cover all regions of Taiwan and all classes of people.55

The groups targeted by CCP United Front is now broadly focused on 10 constituencies that include grass-roots villages, youth, students, Chinese spouses, aboriginals, pro-China political parties and groups, religious organizations, distant relatives, fishermen’s associations, and retired generals.56 Beijing’s strategy include utilizing CCP United Front organizations to invite grass-roots village chiefs in Taiwan to travel to China and form a relationship through creating “village of the same name.” Efforts also include providing more incentives for Taiwan’s high school graduates to study at Chinese universities. There are currently around 330,000 wives with Chinese passports in Taiwan and many are allegedly close with pro-unification groups. There are also around 400,000 indigenous people in Taiwan, and Beijing would dole out goods, money and invite them to travel to China. The case of the New Party’s spokesman and his ties with TAO is under investigation and Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau revealed that the New Party

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55 http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20170524000115-260203
56 See, e.g., http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1168821 (包括基層村里、青年、學生、中配、原住民、親中政黨與政治團體、宗教宮廟、同鄉宗親、農漁會、退將等，藉此從事對台工作)
would receive subsidies from China every year. Beijing is also conducting a large number of temple exchanges between the two sides to promote cultural and religious affinity between the two sides. There are also constant exchanges between relatives of the same surname, hoping to form “a family of two sides of the strait.” 57 The Agriculture and Fisheries Association also reportedly plays an important role for CCP United Front through which Chinese businesses would go through local pro-China legislators in Taiwan to purchase local marine products wholesale and make the local industries beholden to Beijing’s policy preferences. 58

Wittingly or unwittingly, Taiwan’s pro-unification groups or pro-China public associations invite United Front groups to visit Taiwan for these exchanges. 59 United Front organizations will also sponsor these exchanges, offer scholarships, and other incentives to these targeted constituencies. 60 Once unthinkable, the use of pseudo-academic conferences to reframe historical events to emphasize KMT-CCP unity are also now a common occurrences on anniversaries of major historical events in Chinese history. 61 These activities, however, are not all seemingly benign. CCP’s United Front work in Taiwan are also alleged to include sponsoring organized criminal activities to stir up inter-ethnic conflict and to destabilize society. 62 It is not known how successful the CCP has been in conducting espionage through these channels.

Media control is also a tool for United Front. Propaganda and disinformation are most efficiently conveyed by mass media and are the principal means of United Front. Propaganda and disinformation are means to propagate the CCP’s narrative that limits opposing views and supports the legitimacy of the CCP. 63 The goal of Chinese disinformation in Taiwan, as noted by a veteran journalist in Taiwan, J. Michael Cole, “is to sow confusion; weaken trust in the nation’s democratic institutions and leadership; exacerbate divisions between political parties, within civil society and among Chinese dissidents; and raise suspicions of treasonous intent toward retired generals and defense officials—all with the ultimate goal of breaking morale and impairing people’s immunity to Beijing’s propaganda on unification.” 64

When assessing the implications of CCP influence operations, how should policy makers frame this issue?

United Front and influence operations are a CCP-led strategy that integrates party and state resources in a whole-of-society approach (through organizations like Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) to control, indoctrinate, and mobilize non-CCP masses in service of Party-defined objectives.

57 http://globaltaiwan.org/2017/01/11-gtb-2-2/#RH011117
59 See, e.g., http://www.chinatimes.com/cn/newspapers/20170524000115-260203 (知情人士說，中國各級台辦、統戰部、重要涉台社團等人員，利用我方統派團體或親中相關公協會安排來台，遂行統戰目的交流；此外，中國經貿團體在台辦事處、中資公司與中企在台辦事人員，不乏具有兼具官員身分，也會配合中方指示在台工作。)
60 https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/02/weapon-without-war-chinas-united-front-strategy/
63 https://sentinel.tw/china-disinformation-tw/
64 https://sentinel.tw/china-disinformation-tw/
The 13th CPPCC is composed of 2,158 diverse members and it is headed by a chairperson and nearly two-dozen vice chairpersons. The chairperson of the CPPCC has always been a senior member of the CCP to underscore the leadership of the Party over all of Chinese society. The CPPCC is the highest-level entity overseeing the United Front system. The CPPCC is a senior consultative body that exercises “democratic supervision” over non-CCP parties, mass organizations, and prominent personalities. It promotes political unity and social stability through controlled representation in China’s political, economic, social, and cultural lives.

As such, the composition of the CPPCC is represented by CCP-aligned political parties (e.g., Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang), people’s organizations, and sectors. The CPPCC’s function is that of an advisory role, that not only provides recommendations for government policy, but perhaps more importantly for its convening function, by which, policies set by the CCP are disseminated to all the social groups represented in the advisory body.

It is worth noting that the Conference was originally set up as a dialogue mechanism between the Nationalist Party and the CPP for discussion over the sharing of power after World War II. Its meetings are usually held in tandem with the legislative body, the National People's Congress. Given its convening function, the CCP’s control of political parties, organizations, and sectors through the Conference and its special committees serve an important function in the CCP’s United Front work. Indeed, on January 16, Wang Yang chaired the National United Front Department Directors (全國統戰部長會議) meeting.

CPPCC sub-committees are an important means of coordination within the United Front system. The directors of at least three former key military organizations—General Political Department Liaison Department, General Staff Department Second Department, and Ministry of National Defense Foreign Affairs Office—coordinate foreign influence operations with civilian counterparts through the CPPCC External Friendship Sub-Committee.

These efforts have been and continue to be a Party-led initiative and should not be conflated with an over simplified generalization found in the use of "Chinese" influence operations. To target a response to these measures, the response must be narrowly tailored to focus on Party-apparatuses and not the Chinese population in general.

**How does Beijing seek to influence Taiwan’s relationship with the United States? What is the result? What are the implications for the United States of China’s attempts to influence Taiwan?**

Beijing uses United Front activities to weaken Taiwan’s relationship with the United States—its principal security partner—by exacerbating tensions within Taiwan’s society thereby leading to greater polarization and less national cohesion. In this effort, United Front work seeks to amplify sympathetic elements and isolate adversaries within Taiwanese society.

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65 [https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf](https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf)
67 [https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf](https://www.project2049.net/documents/PLA_General_Political_Department_Liaison_Stokes_Hsiao.pdf)
From a propaganda and disinformation perspectives, it deliberately obfuscates the meaning and interpretations of US policy towards Taiwan. The case in point is the constant blurring of the line between the PRC’s “One-China principle” and the US “One-China” policy (一個中國政策)—suggesting an alignment of Beijing’s and Washington’s policies and co-management of the Taiwan issue. It exacerbates fears of abandonment by the United States in Taiwan society and fans the flames of war in the Taiwan Strait to create a psychological effect in the population to stir unrest.

From such issues as the US willingness to defend Taiwan or its use as a bargaining chip, to the US position on Taiwan’s legal status, or whether it is in support for Taiwan arms sales, Beijing’s United Front activities are aimed at strengthening strategic alliances within Taiwan society to propagate, disinform, and cultivate a narrative that influences national discourse in the island’s democracy. Through its United Front activities targeting retired senior military officers, it can also weaken military morale and willingness to fight. The psychological effect of watching high-ranking former-military officers attend lavish events in China and say such things as is often quoted back in the media reflect negatively on the people in active service. Most troubling perhaps is the implications of United Front work in enhancing the Ministry of State Security’s ability to recruit spies within Taiwan.

United Front activities are also used to highlight the ethnic and cultural affinity between the people of the two sides for the purpose of narrowing the “us” versus “them” mentality resulting from decades of political indoctrination. More notably, however, is that this campaign presents China as Taiwan’s natural partner for cultural and ethnic reasons—not the United States despite the two countries’ shared values of democracy and human rights.

U.S. policy towards Taiwan over the past 45 years has operated on the premise that America’s primary interest is in the process—as opposed to the outcome—of resolving differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. What by design was inherently a passive approach that intentionally ceded the initiative of shaping the outcome to Taipei and Beijing. It was an approach that some senior U.S. policymakers at the time expected would create a fait accompli, and yet one that provided Washington with the flexibility to adapt and respond to broader geopolitical challenges while maintaining stability in the strait.\(^{68}\) PRC was still weak\(^ {69}\) in the 1970s and the implications of Taiwan’s eventual unification with the PRC did not weigh heavily in the assessment of the long-term challenges of China’s strategic goals. Many policymakers now recognize that these expectations of China were wrong and misguided.\(^ {70}\) The impact of a concerted and long-term United Front efforts could be the gradual shift in policy that would not be in US long-term interests.

**What role does the UFWD play in influencing domestic policy and social issues in Taiwan, such as growing Taiwanese national identity? How does the UFWD pursue these goals?**

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\(^{69}\) One of the United States’ primary motivation to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC was to shore up China’s weaknesses, which it saw as a grave threat to Soviet encroachment.

\(^{70}\) [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/china-reckoning](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-02-13/china-reckoning)
United Front work directly and indirectly influence domestic policy and social issues in Taiwan. Taiwan is a free society wherein people are able to peacefully assemble. Groups that are pro-unification are not an exception to that rule. Sympathetic groups to CCP United Front are allowed to legally register as non-governmental organizations and have infiltrated civil society. United Front may be directly involved in, at least, financially supporting smaller political parties on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{71} The interaction between the explicitly pro-unification New Party and China is now under investigation by the Taiwan government.\textsuperscript{72} Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau—which is similar to the FBI—revealed that New Party would receive subsidies from China every year.

Since the 1980s, retired military officers from Taiwan conduct exchanges with their counterparts in China, on occasions the retired officers would return to Taiwan and organize political rallies that opposes the central government’s cross-Strait policies, as well as contentious domestic issues such as over military pension reforms.\textsuperscript{73} Whether there was specific direction from the Chinese government to engage in these specific activities are not known. Furthermore, the members in these groups are limited. The relationship between organized crime, political parties, and their relationship with United Front work are also an issue with the formation of the Chinese Unity Promotion Party by Chang An-lo, the former head of the triad, in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{74}

United Front also uses its leverage over Taiwanese businesses to demand political concessions whether forcing statements by leading businessman in support of Beijing’s policies or reprimanding Taipei or encouraging businesspersons to vote in Taiwan for Beijing’s preferred party and candidates. In a recent case, the Taiwanese business associations in China has taken a pro-Beijing policy in response to the Taipei government’s handling of the M-503 flight route that led to the cancellation of some planned cross-Strait charter flights—the association head seemed more critical of Taipei than of their host in Beijing. These measures use both coercive and covert means to influence media integrity, free speech, academic freedom, political processes. However, it appears to be creating a counter-productive effect in some cases—and the long-term implications are not clear.

Members of these United Front groups appear to be limited in comparison to the mainstream population, but the saturated media environment in Taiwan has amplified their perceived effect. The trend suggests that the effectiveness of CCP United Front against Taiwan has been limited although it may have some impact. At its height in 2014, the percentage of people who identified as Taiwanese was 60.6 percent, it was also the low for those who identify as both Taiwanese and Chinese at 32.5 percent, whereas people who identified as only Chinese was at 3.5 percent. In 2017, the figure for Taiwanese was at 55.3 percent, both Taiwanese and Chinese at 37.3 percent, and only Chinese at 3.7 percent.\textsuperscript{75} While there appears to be a correlation between the timing of when guidance for United Front work began after the Sunflower movement with the decrease in the percentage of people who identified as Taiwanese, the percentage may also simply be

\textsuperscript{71} https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/asia/taiwan-china-new-party.html
\textsuperscript{72} https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/world/asia/taiwan-china-new-party.html
\textsuperscript{73} http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2134887/taiwans-military-veterans-clash-police-pension-protest
\textsuperscript{74} https://www.ft.com/content/b09de5d0-aa76-11e7-93c5-648314d2c72c
\textsuperscript{75} http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166#
naturally readjusting to the surge from the Sunflower movement. In short, it is too early to conclude whether the effects of the measures had a direct or indirect impact on Taiwan’s self-identification. Furthermore, it is not clear to what extent the polling data represents the young generation, which were in large part the participants in the movement, and the clear targets of the current United Front policies. The polling does indicate, however, that national identification is fluid and not unidirectional.

**How well understood are CCP influence operations in Taiwan?**

There is awareness among policy elites of the tactics, techniques, and procedures associated with Chinese influence operations, but the central government’s response has not kept pace with scale, pace, and sophistication of CCP United Front and influence operations against Taiwan.\(^76\)

As noted earlier, CCP United Front is a whole-of-society strategy, and it requires a whole-of-society response. One of the challenges lie in wanting to encourage cross-Strait exchanges to minimize misunderstanding, but on other hand protecting the people from covert and coercive activities that tear at the fabrics of a democratic society. Recent amendments to legislations and draft regulations in Taiwan such as revisions of the National Security Act to make punishments for espionage\(^77\) more severe and placing additional limits on active duty as well as retired senior military officers\(^78\) travels to China are necessary and long overdue but insufficient.

**The Commission is mandated to make policy recommendations to Congress based on its hearings and other research. What are your recommendations for Congressional action related to the topic of your testimony?**

1. The mission of the State Department’s Center for Global Engagement (GEC) should be expanded to authorize it to work with other like-minded governments and include civil society participants to counter CCP influence operations. A whole-of-society approach, which engages all aspects of society, must be adopted to counter authoritarian influence operations such as United Front. Taiwan can share information about tactics, techniques, and procedures to identify patterns of behaviors of CCP United Front, but it needs assistance in countering these activities.

2. CCP influence operations utilizes media and academic institutions as a tool for its propaganda and disinformation. Greater transparency measures and medial literacy are necessary to ensure that these pillars of democracy are not unduly influenced. Democracies should be encouraged to work closer together not to promote regime changes in authoritarian countries but to protect democratic institutions.

3. CCP United Front activities are directed at not only influencing the target countries’ relations with China but also weakening support for the United States, to counter these measures the United States should bolster its public diplomacy effort with Taiwan. While symbolic measures are often criticized for lacking substance, symbolic measures can have the effect of shoring up moral and boost public confidence.

4. The Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) carried out by the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic Cultural Representative Office has been an

\(^76\) [http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20180321/108056/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-MattisP-20180321.pdf](http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA05/20180321/108056/HHRG-115-FA05-Wstate-MattisP-20180321.pdf)


effective mechanism through which the United States and Taiwan cooperate to leverage Taiwan’s strength and increase its international space. This is especially important as the PRC continues to pressure and isolate Taipei in the international community. The GCTF should be adequately resourced to carry out its mission.

5. The United States, Taiwan, and other countries facing CCP United Front activities should form a “United Front Financing Task Force” to actively monitor and trace the money flows from PRC government organizations to these front organizations in the United States, Taiwan, and other countries to ensure that they are operating legally and not used for covert or coercive ends.