

February 20, 2025

Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick

Senior Research Scientist, China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division, CNA

“Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission”

USCC Hearing on An Axis of Autocracy? China’s Relations with Russia, Iran, and North Korea

*Disclaimer: The views expressed in this testimony are those of the author and do not reflect those of CNA or its sponsors.*

## **China’s Military Cooperation and Activities with Russia, Iran, and North Korea**

### **1) What are China’s objectives for its military cooperation with Russia, Iran, and North Korea?**

#### **What does it hope to gain strategically or operationally?**

*China-Russia Military Cooperation.* China and Russia often say they have “back-to-back” cooperation, meaning that their partnership—especially their border demarcation agreements and a commitment to peaceful resolution of any bilateral disputes—enable them to avoid the two-front war challenge they faced during their period of mutual hostility in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.<sup>1</sup> Strategically, the development of the Sino-Russian partnership beginning in the mid-1990s has facilitated China’s aim to become a maritime great power and focus military resources in the Indo-Pacific region. Operationally, military exercises with Russia provide China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a wealth of knowledge about modern warfare and help redress the PLA’s own lack of battlefield experience since the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. In particular, Chinese military analysts are paying close attention to Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine and are mining the conflict for information about the role of new technologies in warfare, the performance of particular systems, the role of ground forces in modern warfare, and the challenges of combined operations.<sup>2</sup>

*China-Iran Military Cooperation.* China was Iran’s primary source of weapons in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War, but thanks to reverse-engineering of Chinese systems and the development of a domestic weapons industry, Iran now claims it is 90% self-sufficient.<sup>3</sup> UN sanctions in 2007 restricted any resumption of PRC arms sales to Iran and they have not resumed

<sup>1</sup> For more on this period, see Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001 and 2014).

<sup>2</sup> David Finkelstein, “Beijing’s Ukrainian Battle Lab,” May 2, 2022, <https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/beijings-ukrainian-battle-lab/>. For detailed discussions of particular issues, see the series of articles in 2023-23 by Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter in *The Diplomat*, <https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/as-russias-military-stumbles-in-ukraine-chinese-strategists-are-taking-notes/>.

<sup>3</sup> “Rear Admiral Sayyari: Iran Army 90% Self-Sufficient in Making Defense Equipment,” April 18, 2023, <https://en.mehrnews.com/news/199664/Iran-Army-90-self-sufficient-in-making-defense-equipment>.

to any significant degree since the removal of sanctions in 2020. However, China and Iran have had regular strategic dialogue through the China-Iran Joint Military Commission and they cooperate in training and bilateral exercises. In January 2021, China gave Iran access to the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS), thereby helping Iran improve the accuracy of its missiles. In March of that year, the two countries signed a 25-year strategic partnership agreement.<sup>4</sup> The agreement was controversial in Iran, due to fears of economic dependence on China, and it took several years to conclude. China has viewed Iran as important to its energy security, but also has sought to balance ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia.<sup>5</sup>

*China-North Korea Military Cooperation.* North Korea is China's only officially acknowledged military ally, and according to the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance, most recently renewed in 2021, the two countries are obligated to render assistance to one another in case of attack.<sup>6</sup> However, Shen Zhihua, the leading Chinese historian of PRC-North Korea relations, has called the treaty "a scrap of paper" ever since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul in 1992. In his view, North Korea's nuclear ambitions put China's security at risk, making Pyongyang Beijing's "latent enemy."<sup>7</sup>

China has made few comments about the recent deepening of military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.<sup>8</sup> For North Korea, its closer ties to Russia provide greater leverage in Pyongyang's relationship with Beijing, though Russia cannot substitute for China as an economic partner. Although North Korea depends on China for more than 90% of its trade, Chinese officials have been reluctant to use that leverage as this could contribute to instability in North Korea and lead to a flow of refugees into northeast China. Although North Korea's overt military aid to Russia taints China by association, there was a report that one of the North Korean vessels used in its illicit weapons deliveries to Russia was serviced in a Chinese port, suggesting some limited support by a Chinese entity.<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> On China-Iran military ties, see "Iran & China Military Ties," June 28, 2023, <https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2023/jun/28/iran-china-military-ties>.

<sup>5</sup> MD. Muddassir Quamar, "China and Saudi Arabia: A Deepening Strategic Partnership," January 16, 2025, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/china-and-saudi-arabia-a-deepening-strategic-partnership>. China signed a strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia, one of its top energy suppliers, and encouraged Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume their own bilateral relations in 2023.

<sup>6</sup> For a full text of the treaty, see [https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china\\_dprk.htm](https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/documents/china_dprk.htm). For background, see Charles Parton and David Byrne, "China's Only Ally," July 2, 2021, <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/chinas-only-ally>; Benjamin Frohman, Emma Rafaelof, and Alexis Dale-Huang, *The China-North Korea Strategic Rift: Background and Implications for the United States*, January 24, 2022, [https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North\\_Korea\\_Strategic\\_Rift.pdf](https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/China-North_Korea_Strategic_Rift.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Chris Buckley, "Excerpt from a Chinese Historian's Speech on North Korea," April 18, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/18/world/asia/north-korea-south-china-shen-zhihua.html>.

<sup>8</sup> For more on this topic, see Elizabeth Wishnick, Sino-Russian Partnership: Cooperation without Coordination," forthcoming *China Leadership Monitor* Spring 2025 Issue 83, [www.prcleader.org](http://www.prcleader.org); Dennis Wilder, "President Xi's High Wire Act on Russia-North Korea Entente," November 1, 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/president-xis-high-wire-act-russia-north-korea-entente>.

<sup>9</sup> Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom, "Exclusive: China Harbors Ship Tied to North Korea-Russia Arms Transfers Satellite Images Show," April 25, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/china-harbors-ship-tied-north-korea-russia-arms-transfers-satellite-images-show-2024-04-25/>.

**2) What are the key areas of military and technical cooperation between China and Russia? What else could China seek to gain from further military and technical cooperation with Russia?**

China and Russia claim they are priority partners not allies,<sup>10</sup> but military and technical cooperation has been an important aspect of their relations since the establishment of their strategic partnership in 1996. Key areas of military and technical cooperation between China and Russia today include: bilateral and multilateral military exercises, regular consultations and five-year planning documents, arms and weapons component sales, and joint production and systems development. Collaboration by Chinese and Russian actors in hybrid maritime actions has been a new area of activity since 2023.

**Military exercises.** China and Russia have participated in more than 100 bilateral and multilateral exercises since 2005, with half taking place since 2017. The increased frequency needs to be kept in perspective—NATO conducts approximately 100 exercises in an average year.<sup>11</sup> Despite the ongoing war in Ukraine, China and Russia have continued to engage in regular military exercises at pre-war levels of activity and even expanded their geographic scope and frequency in 2024. They also have become more complex, as some exercises have involved conducting joint air and naval patrols, in one instance taking off from a base in Anadyr in northeastern Russia, which expanded the range of the Chinese aircraft. Thus far, they have avoided exercises in sensitive areas such as disputed waters in the South China Sea. The consequences for interoperability are discussed in Question 3.

**Consultations, planning, and joint statements.** China and Russia first defined the basic framework for their military cooperation in the 2001 Sino-Russian Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.<sup>12</sup> Since then China and Russia have outlined joint positions on some aspects of arms control, held annual bilateral security consultations since

<sup>10</sup> On the Sino-Russian partnership since 2022, see Elizabeth Wishnick, “‘A Superior Relationship’: How the Russian Invasion of Ukraine Has Deepened the Sino-Russian Partnership,” *China Leadership Monitor*, Summer 2023 Issue 76, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/a-superior-relationship-how-the-invasion-of-ukraine-has-deepened-the-sino-russian-partnership>.

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed discussion of the Sino-Russian exercises, see Dmitry Gorenburg, Paul Schwartz, Brian Waidelich, and Elizabeth Wishnick with contributions by Mary Chesnut and Brooke Lennox, *Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation*, March 2023, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/Russian-Chinese-Military-Cooperation.pdf>, pp. 49-65; Brian Hart, Bonny Lin, Matthew P. Funaiolo, Samantha Lu, Hannah Price, Nicholas Kaufman, and Gavril Torrijos, “How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?” <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/>. On recent developments see Wishnick, “Sino-Russian Partnership: Cooperation without Coordination,” and “Recent Developments in Sino-Russian relations: A Conversation with Dr. Elizabeth Wishnick,” <https://chinapower.csis.org/podcasts/recent-developments-in-sino-russian-relations/>.

<sup>12</sup> In this treaty, China and Russia pledge not to use or threaten force or pressure each other economically, to resolve differences peacefully, to develop confidence-building, not to target third countries, to refrain from alliances with other countries that would adversely impact the other, to immediately hold consultations in case of a severe threat to peace or sovereignty or in the event of aggression, to oppose actions that threaten stability and consult in the event they occur, to promote nuclear disarmament and combat proliferation, to cooperate in military technology and observe intellectual property rules. “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation,” [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa\\_eng/wjdt\\_665385/2649\\_665393/200107/t20010724\\_679026.html](https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/200107/t20010724_679026.html).

2005, conducted twice-yearly dialogues on Northeast Asian security since 2014, and, beginning in 2017, signed two successive five-year roadmaps for bilateral military cooperation. These dialogues and roadmaps are meant to enhance communication and enable long-term planning of joint initiatives.<sup>13</sup> During their regular summit meetings, Xi and Putin have issued several statements about their shared objectives in arms control, though their individual deployments create some differences on specific issues. Since the onset of Russia's full-scale war in Ukraine, China and Russia also have issued several statements about global security and we have seen greater agreement between them on the growing threat they perceive from NATO in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.<sup>14</sup> However, Russia's use of nuclear threats and targeting Ukraine's nuclear power plants has emerged as a potential red line for China, which has otherwise been a key supporter, albeit short of direct government-identified assistance.

***Arms and weapons components sales.*** Initially, from the early 1990s to 2005, Russian arms sales to China—\$2-3 billion annually—were crucial to both countries, enabling Russia to maintain its “company towns” dedicated to producing particular weapons systems and providing China with the advanced military technology it was prohibited from buying from western countries due to sanctions. Russian allegations of Chinese reverse-engineering and underpayment and the development of an indigenous defense industry in China led their arms sales to crater for about a decade from 2005-2015.

After 2015, China signed two major arms contracts with Russia, \$2 billion for Su-37 fighter aircraft and \$3 billion for S-400 air defense systems. Agreements for other systems soon followed in the next two years then stalled again after 2017, as China needed to buy fewer complete systems from Russia. Before 2022, China and Russia planned to shift to co-production of several defense systems, including ballistic missile defense and a heavy-lift helicopter. It remains unclear where these plans stand given the overall collapse of Russian arms exports since 2021.<sup>15</sup> There are other joint projects on the table—Putin also promised to help China develop a ballistic missile defense system which would help China narrow the gap with the US and acquire technology commensurate with the PRC's great power status.<sup>16</sup> Russia may be sharing its sensitive submarine technology with China, according to some reports, which, if true, would pose a major challenge to the US.<sup>17</sup> Despite the talk of co-production, Russia's recent defense

---

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed discussion of these consultations and agreements, see CNA, *Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation*, 6-22.

<sup>14</sup> China and Russia object to the term “Indo-Pacific” and refer to East Asia and the Pacific.

<sup>15</sup> John C.K. Daly, “Russian Arms Exports Collapse by 92 Percent as Military-Industrial Complex Fails,” January 15, 2025, <https://jamestown.org/program/russian-arms-exports-collapse-by-92-percent-as-military-industrial-complex-fails/>. Nevertheless, Russian Vice-Premier Denis Manturov now claims that the heavy-lift helicopter project is moving forward after years of preliminary talks. “Russian Helicopters Developing Systems for China's New Heavy Helo,” May 21, 2024, <https://aviationweek.com/defense/aircraft-propulsion/russian-helicopters-developing-systems-chinas-new-heavy-helo>.

<sup>16</sup> Cited in Tong Zhao and Dmitry Stefanovich, *Managing the Impact of Missile Defense on U.S.-China Strategic Stability 2023*, <https://www.amacad.org/publication/missile-defense-and-strategic-relationship-among-united-states-russia-and-china/section/2>.

<sup>17</sup> Patrick Tucker, “Russian Tech Could Help China Outpace US: INDOPACOM,” November 23, 2024, <https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/11/russian-submarine-tech-could-help-china-out-pace-us-says-indopacom-chief/401270/>; Dr. Sarah Kirchberger and CAPT Christopher P. Carlson (USN-retired), “Is Russia

cooperation with China has been more limited, involving supplying a particular component or software.<sup>18</sup>

**Gray-Zone Operations.** Since 2023 Chinese and Russian actors have been more involved in gray-zone operations in Europe, at the very least in parallel, and in some cases in concert. There have been a series of cable-cutting incidents in the Baltic Sea involving China-flagged vessels and Russia-related operations that have unnerved Nordic and Baltic states. In October 2023, China’s government claimed responsibility for damage to the Balticconnector undersea gas pipeline, but blamed the cable-cutting on an error by the Chinese captain of the NewNewPolarBear, a Hong Kong-flagged vessel that sails the Russian Northern Sea Route.<sup>19</sup> The Yuan Peng 3, another China-flagged ship, is suspected of sabotaging undersea cables between Sweden and Germany after departing from a Russian Baltic port.<sup>20</sup>

**China’s support for Russia’s full-scale war in Ukraine.** The Chinese government claims it does not send lethal aid to Russia for its war effort in Ukraine, but 78% of Russian imports of semiconductors and 96% of smart cards—important components for a wide range of military technologies—come from China.<sup>21</sup> Chinese companies also provide an extensive array of other dual-use items, such as navigation equipment, jamming devices, aircraft parts, drones, rifles, ammunition and trucks. The US Treasury and US Department of Commerce have sanctioned numerous Chinese companies for sanctions violation of sanctions as well as the financial entities that were set up to circumvent sanctions on payment processing.<sup>22</sup>

---

Helping China Build a Hybrid-Nuclear Submarine?” January 26, 2025, <https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/is-russia-helping-china-with-hybrid-nuclear-submarine>.

<sup>18</sup> CNA, *Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation*, 35.

<sup>19</sup> Finbarr Bermingham, “China Admits Hong Kong-Flagged Ship Destroyed Key Baltic Gas Pipeline ‘By Accident’,” August 12, 2024, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3274120/china-admits-hong-hong-flagged-ship-destroyed-key-baltic-gas-pipeline-accident?module=inline&pgtype=article>.

<sup>20</sup> Shannon Tiezzi, “Chinese Vessel Suspected of Damaging European Submarine Cables,” November 22, 2024, <https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/chinese-vessel-suspected-of-damaging-european-submarine-cables/>.

<sup>21</sup> “Russia Semiconductor Imports Dashboard: Pre and Post Invasion Trends,” Silverado Policy Accelerator, Aug. 24, 2023, <https://silverado.org/data-dashboards/russia-semiconductor-imports-dashboard-pre-and-post-invasion-trends/>; CNA, *Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation*, March 2023, 33.

<sup>22</sup> “Treasury Disrupts Russia’s Sanctions Evasion Schemes, January 15, 2025, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2785>. Also see CNA, *Russian-Chinese Military Cooperation*, 87.; Dmitry Gorenburg, Samuel Bendett, Ken Gause, Pavel Luzin (Center for European Policy Analysis), Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez, Paul Schwartz, and Elizabeth Wishnick, with contributions by Michael Connell and Julian Waller, *Crafting the Russian War Economy*, CNA, October 2024, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2024/10/Crafting-the-Russian-War-Economy.pdf>; Eleanor Hume and Rowan Scarpino, “Sanctions by the Numbers: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations’ Sanctions and Export Controls on China,” October 23, 2024, <https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/sanctions-by-the-numbers-comparing-the-trump-and-biden-administrations-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-china>.

China reportedly has sent drone parts to Iran,<sup>23</sup> which in turn provides drone technology to Russia. It is unclear whether or not the Chinese drone parts are components of the technology Iran sends to Russia.<sup>24</sup>

In October 2024, the US sanctioned two companies in southeastern China for producing drones for Russia, the first evidence of Chinese firms producing complete weapons systems for use in Ukraine.<sup>25</sup> A few months later the EU sanctioned Chinese firms in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where PRC central authorities play a leading role in the provincial economy, for producing drones for Russia.<sup>26</sup> European intelligence agencies claim that Chinese companies in Xinjiang as well as in Shenzhen and Xiamen have been involved in Russia's production of the Garpiya-3 long-range attack drone, similar to the US Reaper.<sup>27</sup>

**3) Are Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea taking steps towards interoperability or greater military coordination with their joint exercises? Describe the implications of these exercises for the United States and its allies and partners.**

*China-Russia Exercises.* The US Department of Defense finds that the Sino-Russian military exercises have “only modestly improved their capabilities and interoperability.”<sup>28</sup> Training for improved interoperability assumes that China and Russia coordinate their foreign policies, which they do not.<sup>29</sup> Although they share certain broad goals, such as pushing back on what they perceive as US and NATO pressure and safeguarding their authoritarian regimes from western interference, China and Russia have different foreign policy interests, priorities, and tools at their disposal. Unlike the NATO alliance, where the diverse membership train for combined operations, China and Russia largely train together to improve confidence-building and develop familiarity with their different technologies and approaches to combat. Chinese forces, which have not fought in a war since 1979, also seek to learn from Russian combat experience. For both China and Russia, signaling is an important part of the joint exercises, which often precede or follow exercises by the US and its allies. Through these exercises China and Russia enhance

<sup>23</sup>“Iran’s Eastward Turn to Russia and China: A Conversation with Nicole Grajewski, Nader Habibi, and Gary Samore,” May 20, 2024, <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/crown-conversations/cc-22.html>.

<sup>24</sup> On Iran-Russia military relations, see Julian Waller, Elizabeth Wishnick, Margaret Sparling, and Michael Connell, *The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship*, January 29, 2025, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2025/01/the-evolving-russia-iran-relationship>.

<sup>25</sup> Nectar Gan, “US imposes first sanctions on Chinese firms for making weapons for Russia’s war in Ukraine,” October 18, 2024, <https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/18/china/us-sanctions-chinese-companies-attack-drones-russia-intl-hnk/index.html>.

<sup>26</sup> Finbarr Bermingham, “EU Has ‘Conclusive’ Proof of Armed Drones for Russia Being Made in China: Sources,” November 15, 2024, <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3286819/eu-has-conclusive-proof-armed-drones-russia-being-made-china-sources>.

<sup>27</sup>“Exclusive: Russia Has Secret War Drones Project in China, Intel Sources Say,” September 25, 2024, <https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/>.

<sup>28</sup> <https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF>. P. 15.

<sup>29</sup> For more on this see, Wishnick, “Sino-Russian Partnership: Cooperation without Coordination.”

the deterrent value of their partnership, by creating ambiguity about its scope, especially in a future conflict in Taiwan or the South China Sea.<sup>30</sup>

***China-Russia-Iran Naval Exercises.*** China, Russia, and Iran have participated annually in trilateral naval exercises, known as the Maritime Security Belt, since 2019 (with the exception of 2021 when China did not participate). In 2019, they were held in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean and emphasized anti-piracy and counterterrorism. In 2022, the trilateral exercise took place in the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea and focused on search and rescue, including nighttime shooting drills. In 2023 the three navies engaged in counterterrorism, anti-piracy, and search and rescue exercises in the Gulf of Oman. In 2024, the three navies participated in a hostage rescue exercise in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean.<sup>31</sup> The purpose of the exercises is to demonstrate the geographic extent of the Sino-Russian partnership and to showcase their commitment to combating piracy, a key focus of the drills and a longstanding aim of Sino-Russian naval exercises. The first Sino-Russian naval drills in 2009 focused on combating piracy in the Gulf of Aden.

***China-Russia-North Korea Exercises.*** According to the South Korean National Intelligence Service, Russia may have proposed that North Korea participate in a trilateral naval exercise in 2023, but this never took place.<sup>32</sup> There have been no trilateral exercises of any kind to date, although General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, reported that North Korea participated as an observer for the first time in Russia's large-scale OKEAN-24 naval exercise in September 2024.<sup>33</sup> A South Korean analysis of North Korea's perspective on trilateral exercises with China and Russia argues that North Korean leaders have been wary of such engagement due to their priority on Juche (self-reliance ideology), negative experiences from the Korean War, and fear of pro-China domestic political opponents, but that more active US-South Korea-Japan alliance ties may change that calculation.<sup>34</sup>

In October 2024, North Korea began sending troops to Russia for the Kursk front in the Russian war in Ukraine in accordance with their June 19, 2024 bilateral treaty, which provides for military assistance in the event of an attack on one of the two parties.<sup>35</sup> The North Korean troops, which may number as many as 11,000, first received training at the Sergeevka military base just

---

<sup>30</sup> On strategic ambiguity in the Sino-Russian partnership, see Elizabeth Wishnick, "Strategic Ambiguity and the Deterrent Value of the Sino-Russian Partnership," China Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University, October 31, 2022, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2022-10-31%20Strategic%20Ambiguity%20and%20the%20Deterrent%20Value%20of%20the%20Sino-Russian%20Partnership.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> On these exercises, see CNA, *The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship*, 44.

<sup>32</sup> Kim Tong-Hyung, "Seoul's Spy Agency Says Russia Has Likely Proposed North Korea to Join Three-Way Drills with China," September 4, 2023, <https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-russia-military-cooperation-ukraine-china-55918dc4b8672a15ae103eb5fea2a930>.

<sup>33</sup> Anton Sokolin, "North Korea Joined Russian Military Drills as Observer for the First Time: Moscow," December 23, 2024, <https://www.nknews.org/2024/12/north-korea-joined-russian-military-drills-as-observer-for-first-time-moscow/>.

<sup>34</sup> Youngjun Kim (Korea National Defense University), "Will North Korea Join China and Russia in a Military Exercise? A Game Changer for Northeast Asian Security Architecture," *The Korean Journal of Security Affairs* 28(1) June 2023:31-53.

<sup>35</sup> "DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," June 20, 2024, <http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/6a4ae9a744af8ecd6678c5f1eda29c.kcmsf>.

in Primorski Krai in the Russian Far East, near the North Korean border.<sup>36</sup> The North Korean forces appear to operate separately from other Russian forces in Kursk, due to language barriers and different military cultures, and have their own distinctive operating style.<sup>37</sup> The North Korean forces have suffered heavy losses, as many as 4,000, and seem to be poorly coordinated with Russian forces.<sup>38</sup>

#### 4) How has the Sino-Russian security relationship evolved since Russia's invasion of Ukraine? How does China's leadership perceive the costs and benefits to its support for Russia?

As discussed in the previous questions, the Sino-Russian military relationship has deepened in many respects since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These include:

- Provision by Chinese entities of substantial quantities of dual-use technology for the Russian war effort
- Chinese support for Russian messaging on the war (to be discussed in Question 6);
- Increased frequency and complexity of military exercises
- Regular consultations and planning documents
- Involvement by Chinese and Russian actors in hybrid maritime actions against western interests

These actions have taken place at a time when Chinese and Russian coast guards have committed to greater cooperation in maritime law enforcement in the Northern Sea Route above the Russian Arctic and have participated in joint drills in the Sea of Japan and the Bering Sea. Since 2018, the Chinese Coast Guard has reported to the Central Military Commission, headed by Xi. The Russian Coast Guard reports to the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), one of the power ministries that is directly subordinate to Putin. For both countries, cooperation in between the coast guards is an important step in their security collaboration as it involves joint actions in areas that protect their sovereignty and control over their fishing and energy resources.<sup>39</sup>

Despite their growing military and maritime law enforcement cooperation, China and Russia hold different visions of global security. In April 2022, China announced a Global Security Initiative (GSI) that would foster “a vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and

<sup>36</sup> “North Korean Troops Are Training in Russia: Here’s Why It Matters,” *Wall Street Journal News*, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJ7l\\_a33pk0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VJ7l_a33pk0).

<sup>37</sup> Marc Santora and Helene Cooper, “Fighting Alongside Russia, North Koreans Wage Their Own War,” January 22, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/22/world/europe/north-korea-soldiers-ukraine.html?auth=login-google1tap&login=google1tap>.

<sup>38</sup> John Hardie, “North Korean Troops Pull Back in Kursk as Pyongyang Prepares Fresh Deployment, Sources Say,” January 31, 2025, [https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op\\_ed/2025/01/31/north-korean-troops-pull-back-in-kursk-as-pyongyang-prepares-fresh-deployment-officials-say/](https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op_ed/2025/01/31/north-korean-troops-pull-back-in-kursk-as-pyongyang-prepares-fresh-deployment-officials-say/).

<sup>39</sup> Meia Nouwens and Veerle Nouwens, “China-Russia Coast Guard Cooperation: A New Dimension of China-Russia Relations?” October 16, 2024, <https://chinapower.csis.org/analysis/china-russia-coast-guard-cooperation/>; Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s Coast Guard Cooperation with China Is a Big Step, Arctic Security Expert Says,” April 28, 2023, <https://www.thebarentsobserver.com/security/russias-coast-guard-cooperation-with-china-is-a-big-step-arctic-security-expert-says/164360>.



sustainable security...”<sup>40</sup> At first glance the language of “indivisible security” appears similar to Russian rhetoric on the “indivisibility of security in regional and global contexts” which Putin has used to defend his full-scale war in Ukraine.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, Xi’s GSI envisions global security within a China-led “community of shared future,” while Russia emphasizes a multipolar order of equal sovereign states.

Despite many differences between the two countries (discussed in Question 7), the Chinese leadership continues to view the partnership with Russia as an asset, not a liability. Chinese leaders see Russia supporting China in its competition with the United States and its alliances, contributing to China’s energy and food security, ensuring a peaceful and secure northern border, and buttressing the PRC’s regime security as well as the position of authoritarian states in the global ideological struggle with democracies. Since the onset of the war in 2022, criticism of China-Russia relations has been restricted and only a few critical voices (either by retired officials or scholars writing for foreign audiences) have been able to express any critical views. The criticism that is tolerated mostly has been about Russian policies, not about the fallout of these policies for China.<sup>42</sup>

#### **5) How does Russia’s relationship with North Korea and Iran effect its relationship with China? Are there issues or activities that would be politically sensitive for China?**

*North Korea.* Despite regular Sino-Russian meetings on security issues, the Chinese government has disavowed any knowledge about Russia-North Korea defense cooperation. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Lin Jian stated at a November 1, 2024 press conference that “China is not aware of the specifics of bilateral exchanges and cooperation between the DPRK and Russia.”<sup>43</sup> Their military cooperation poses several challenges for Beijing:

- Turning a blind eye to North Korea’s provision of lethal aid for Russia contradicts China’s position against outside interference and expansion of the war

---

<sup>40</sup>“Full Text: The Global Security Concept Paper,” February 21, 2023, Xinhua, <https://english.news.cn/20230221/75375646823e4060832c760e00a1ec19/c.html>; M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Global Security Initiative At Two: A Journey Not a Destination,” *China Leadership Monitor*, May 30, 2024, <https://www.prcleader.org/post/china-s-global-security-initiative-at-two-a-journey-not-a-destination>.

<sup>41</sup> “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” March 31, 2023, [https://mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/fundamental\\_documents/1860586/](https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/). Heather Ashby and Mary Glantz, “What You Need to Know about Russia’s New Foreign Policy Concept,” May 10, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/05/what-you-need-know-about-russias-new-foreign-policy-concept>.

<sup>42</sup> For a detailed discussion of Chinese views of Russia as asset or liability, see Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Sino-Russian Partnership,” in Bård Nikolas Vik Steen ed., *Not Just Another New Cold War: The Global Implications of US-China Rivalry* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2025).

<sup>43</sup>Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on November 1, 2024, [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202411/t20241101\\_11519937.html](https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/202411/t20241101_11519937.html).

- Russian assistance to North Korean weapons production buttresses calls in South Korea for a nuclear deterrent and contributes to tighter alliance ties among South Korea, Japan and the United States
- China's silence on North Korea-Russia defense ties supports impressions of Beijing's tacit support, thereby denying Chinese officials the opportunity to take advantage of political turmoil in Seoul to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States.

Due to fears of economic instability in North Korea prompting mass migration into China, Chinese officials are so reluctant to use the economic leverage it has over North Korea—dependent on Beijing for over 90% of its trade—that this lever is largely ineffectual. Despite supporting UN sanctions on North Korea's nuclear program, China has refused to require all Chinese entities to enforce them and proved unwilling or unable to convince Russia to do so.<sup>44</sup>

*Iran.* China's ties to Iran largely center on energy— if Russian ties to Iran embolden its nuclear program, a nuclear crisis could endanger maritime energy exports from Iran and other Gulf states to China.<sup>45</sup> Iran is the fourth largest supplier of oil to China, accounting for 10% of supply, although they are not listed officially in Chinese statistics. China's "teapot" refineries (small independent refineries) are responsible for these purchases, which are made in violation of sanctions and occur through third countries or by ship-to-ship transfer. Through these methods China purchases about 90% of Iranian oil.<sup>46</sup>

The deepening partnership between Iran and Russia may compete with China's west-east Middle Corridor of the Belt and Road Initiative and expand Iranian influence in Central Asia, perhaps at China's expense. Iran and Russia are developing an International North-South Transit Corridor, which would also involve India, and develop a new south-north transit and trade artery. The INSTC already plays a role in transporting Iranian military equipment to Russia via the Caspian

---

<sup>44</sup> "China Supported Sanctions on North Korea's Nuclear Program. It's also Behind Their Failure," November 3, 2023, <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-supported-sanctions-on-north-korea-s-nuclear-program-it-s-also-behind-their-failure/7340051.html>.

<sup>45</sup> "Iran's Eastward Turn to Russia and China: A Conversation with Nicole Grajewski, Nader Habibi, and Gary Samore," May 20, 2024, <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/crown-conversations/cc-22.html>; Nicole Grajewski, "An Illusory Entente: The Myth of a Russia-China-Iran 'Axis'," *Asian Affairs*, February 14, 2022, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03068374.2022.2029076?src=#d1e226>; "The Iranian-Chinese Strategic Partnership: Why Now and What it Means: A Conversation with Nader Habibi and Hadi Kahalzadeh," August 28, 2021, <https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/crown-conversations/cc-8.html>.

<sup>46</sup> Erica Downs and Edward Fishman, "Q&A: Potential Impacts of New US Sanctions on Iran's Oil Exports to China," May 28, 2024, <https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/qa-potential-impacts-of-new-us-sanctions-on-irans-oil-exports-to-china/>.

Sea.<sup>47</sup> India sees this route as providing access to the Russian Arctic and a means of competing with China's growing influence there.<sup>48</sup>

**6) How do China and Russia coordinate their efforts in cyber and information operations? Please provide specific examples across military or state-sponsored domains.**

China and Russia increasingly emulate one another in cyber and information operations. The only evidence of possible coordination is the July 2021 agreement July 2021 Russia's Ministry of Digital Development, Communication and Mass Media and China's National Radio and Television Administration to promote exchanges of content and develop joint production.

Since 2022, Russia has enhanced restrictions on access to the Internet, following China's development of the Great Firewall, by criminalizing the use of VPNs in Russia, blocking an increased number of websites, and slowing down YouTube.<sup>49</sup>

Prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine, Chinese information operations focused on promoting Chinese interests and denigrating critics of China, but since 2022 Chinese media outlets have been echoing Russian propaganda on Ukraine. For example, Chinese media have repeated Russia's false claims about the presence of US biolabs in Ukraine.<sup>50</sup> Even as Chinese media support Russian narratives on the war, Chinese information operations also promote the idea that China takes a neutral position on it.<sup>51</sup>

European intelligence officials report that Chinese espionage operations in Europe increasingly share Russian goals of undermining western support for Ukraine and creating division in

---

<sup>47</sup> Iran sends military equipment to Russia covertly via dark port calls (sailing across the Caspian Sea with the required transponder turned off). See CNA, *The Evolving Russia-Iran Relationship*, 39-42; Nurlan Aliyev, "Russia's Vital and Fragile New Trade Artery to Iran," September 28, 2024, <https://ridl.io/russia-s-vital-and-fragile-new-trade-artery-to-iran/>; Nurlan Aliyev, "Iran-Russia Partnership: Friends Forever?" January 25, 2025, <https://ridl.io/iran-russia-partnership-friends-forever/>.

<sup>48</sup> Jawahar Vishnu Bhagwat and Natalia Viakhireva, "India Considers Northern Sea Route Potential," July 31, 2024, <https://russiaincouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/interview/india-considers-northern-sea-route-potential/>; CAPT Anurag Bisen (Indian Navy, Ret.), "Arctic Geopolitics and Governance: An Indian Perspective," August 15, 2024, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/arctic-geopolitics-and-governance-indian-perspective>.

<sup>49</sup> Paul Sonne, "Russia Chokes YouTube Service but Russians Find Ways Around It," January 31, 2025, <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/31/world/europe/russia-youtube.html?auth=login-googlel1tap&login=googlel1tap>; Chiara Castro, "Russia Blocks Almost 200 VPN Services, but the Kremlin Still Wants to Use Them," December 16, 2024, <https://www.techradar.com/pro/vpn/russia-blocks-almost-200-vpn-services-but-the-kremlin-still-wants-to-use-them>; "IntelBrief: Implications of China-Russia Cooperation on Censorship and Disinformation," March 20, 2024, <https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-20/>.

<sup>50</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick and Josiah Case, "China's Aid to Russia: Lip Service?" March 21, 2022, <https://cepa.org/article/chinas-aid-to-russia-lip-service/>; "How China and Russia Use Information Operations to Compete with the US," June 30, 2023, <https://www.cna.org/our-media/indepth/2023/06/how-china-and-russia-use-information-operations-to-compete-with-the-us/>.

<sup>51</sup> Agnieszka Legucka and Justina Szczudlik, "Breaking Down Russian and Chinese Disinformation and Propaganda about the War in Ukraine," The Polish Institute of International Affairs, January 17, 2023, <https://www.pism.pl/publications/breaking-down-russian-and-chinese-disinformation-and-propaganda-about-the-war-in-ukraine>.

European democracies.<sup>52</sup> Following the Russian example, China increasingly uses disinformation to sow distrust and confusion in western societies. While Russia uses a wide range of platforms for its disinformation effort, including social media platforms like X and Truth Social and websites like Reddit and YouTube in addition to state and oligarch-owned media, China primarily uses state-run media.<sup>53</sup> Russian companies like Struktura and the Social Design Agency create hundreds of fake websites that mimic real ones—for example, Reuters.cfd, made to look like the Reuters.com news agency, promotes pro-Russian narratives.

Hacked Russian emails show that in July 2021 Russia's Ministry of Digital Development, Communication and Mass Media and China's National Radio and Television Administration signed an agreement to promote exchanges of content and develop joint production. Thanks to this agreement, Chinese media featured Russian false claims about US biolabs in Ukraine. Cooperation between Chinese and Russian media began in the early 2000s but has become more institutionalized since this agreement. Nonetheless, Chinese and Russian joint efforts largely focus on their domestic audiences,<sup>54</sup> although these publications also are used to shape international opinion, as the case of the biolabs attests.

There were some reports by Ukrainian sources of hacking efforts against Ukraine in March and April 2022 by Chinese hackers connected to the Chinese government,<sup>55</sup> but evidence of Russian and Chinese coordination in hacking activities is lacking. Moreover, Russia's persistent and extensive cyberattacks on Ukraine have been more disruptive than successful in degrading Ukraine's capabilities.<sup>56</sup>

### **7) Describe the areas of divergence in the Sino-Russian relationship. Are there significant points of friction in the Sino-Russian relationship that could derail it?**

Despite the deepening Sino-Russian partnership there are multiple areas of divergence. At this juncture Chinese and Russian officials have made a political decision to emphasize their areas of agreement—all of their joint statements do this, omitting any areas of discord. The latter include:

---

<sup>52</sup> Nicholas Vinocur, “‘Dragon-Bear’: How China and Russia’s Spy Operations Overlap in Europe,” March 13, 2024, <https://www.politico.eu/article/dragon-bear-how-china-and-russias-spy-operations-overlap-in-europe/>.

<sup>53</sup> Joe Stradinger, “Narrative Intelligence: Detecting Chinese and Russian Information Operations to Detect NATO Unity,” November 5, 2024, <https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/11/intelligence-china-russia-information-operations-against-nato/>.

<sup>54</sup> Maria Repnikova, *China-Russia Convergence in the Communication Sphere: Exploring the Growing Information Nexus n.d.* [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Repnikova\\_2022-23%20Wilson%20China%20Fellowship\\_Understanding%20China%20Amid%20Change%20and%20Competition.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/Repnikova_2022-23%20Wilson%20China%20Fellowship_Understanding%20China%20Amid%20Change%20and%20Competition.pdf).

<sup>55</sup> Cristian Segura, “Ukraine Claims Russia Uses Its Cooperation with China to Carry out Cyberattacks,” February 12, 2024, <https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-02-12/ukraine-claims-russia-uses-its-cooperation-with-china-to-carry-out-cyberattacks.html>.

<sup>56</sup> Grace B. Mueller, Benjamin Jensen, Brandon Valeriano, Ryan C. Maness, and Jose M. Macias, “Cyber Operations during the Russo-Ukrainian War,” July 13, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/cyber-operations-during-russo-ukrainian-war>; Jaclyn A. Kerr, Assessing Russian Cyber and Information Warfare in Ukraine, CNA, November 2023, <https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/11/Assessing-Russian-Cyber-and-Information-Warfare-in-Ukraine.pdf>.

- Disagreements over their border history
- Wariness in Russia over China's involvement in the development of the Russian Far East
- Disputes over trade and investment
- Disputes over China's reverse engineering of Russian weapons systems
- Several instances of Russian scientists prosecuted for espionage on behalf of China
- A lack of transparency on key foreign policy issues (2022 Ukraine war, 2022 events in Kazakhstan)
- Competing regional integration strategies
- Russian fears of becoming a resource appendage to China
- Russian identity as an Arctic state and wariness about China's potential role in the region
- Competition over regional leadership in Central Asia
- China's aim to lead a community of common destiny and Russia's opposition to a supporting role in such a framework
- Competition for influence in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

Points of friction, while significant, are unlikely to derail the Sino-Russian partnership as long as Xi and Putin remain at the helm of their respective countries, are able to set limits to domestic nationalism, and continue to be aligned on the primary geopolitical and domestic threats they face.

Historically, the main point of friction to resurface—and on several occasions to lead to localized armed conflict between China and Russia—has been the dispute between the two countries over their lengthy common border. Although the two countries signed border demarcation agreements in 1991 and 2004 and claim to have resolved this issue, the border issue continues to resurface periodically despite the deepening Sino-Russian partnership. Chinese officials claim that the legally ratified borders are based on unequal treaties of the 19<sup>th</sup> century which codify the territorial aggression by the Russian Empire against China. (See Appendix 1) By contrast, Russian officials reject any continuity between the actions of the contemporary Russian state and the Russian empire, but nevertheless see the 19<sup>th</sup> century territorial settlement as righting the wrong that had been done by the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk according to which the Chinese Empire secured recognition of its sovereignty over lands north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River (lands which Russia obtained through the 19<sup>th</sup> century treaties and continues to hold).

China's "wolf warrior diplomats" periodically comment about what they see as past injustices leading to some pushback in Russia. The 250<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of Vladivostok (which means rule the east in Russian) led to some Chinese nationalist posts by PRC diplomats. In February 2023 the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources issued a directive specifying that certain Russian cities would be listed officially by their original names—Vladivostok would thus be Haishenwai and Khabarovsk would be Boli.<sup>57</sup> The same ministry also published a map the next month that showed Heixiazhi (Bolshoi Ussuriiskii) Island (see Appendix 2), divided between

---

<sup>57</sup> Jeff Pao, "China's Ironic Reticence on Land Grab in Ukraine," February 25, 2023, <https://asiatimes.com/2023/02/chinas-ironic-reticence-on-land-grab-in-ukraine/>.

the two countries in a 2004 agreement, as only Chinese.<sup>58</sup> A subsequent joint statement by Xi and Putin in May 2024 emphasized that joint development would proceed on the island, enabling Russia to reaffirm the jointness of the territorial disposition.

Both countries are experiencing growing nationalism, which, if left to develop unchecked, could lead to a resurgence of territorial conflict. History is being reinterpreted in ways that could enhance mistrust and even lead to renewed tensions in the event domestic conditions change in one or both countries.

**8) What recommendations for legislative action would you make based on your testimony?**

*Support for US government agencies and offices that combat Chinese and Russian disinformation and authoritarianism in all four countries.* The one area where there is clear evidence of Sino-Russian coordination is in spreading disinformation directed against the US and its allies. Until recently, the US had several lines of effort to combat these efforts including the US Department of State's Global Engagement Center and the Countering Malign Kremlin Influence Office and Countering Chinese Influence Fund at USAID. Congress should reinstate these offices so that the US continues to have all the tools needed to combat Chinese and Russian disinformation. Additionally, Congress should ensure the continued operation of US-funded media outlets like Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty which support local media to combat Chinese and Russian disinformation, and the National Endowment of Democracy, a bipartisan organization that supports civil society organizations that combat authoritarianism in China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

*Support for US government-funded research on adversary threats.* Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth recently stated that US adversaries have an advantage in long-term planning and the US needs to do the same.<sup>59</sup> To this end Congress should support efforts at the US Department of Defense and throughout the government to carry out the necessary research to identify and assess long-term adversary threats. Congress should reinstate the Global Development Lab at USAID which supported a Higher Education initiative involving data-driven research on China by organizations such as AIDDATA that tracked Chinese influence efforts in countries of interest to the US and provided invaluable data to combat such efforts.<sup>60</sup>

*Continue Efforts to Engage with South Korea and Japan on Northeast Asian Security.* The US should work with our allies to monitor North Korean illegal arms transfer activities through

---

<sup>58</sup> The Soviet Union occupied this island at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers in the Russian Far East in a brief war with China 1929 over the Chinese Eastern Railroad, during which Soviet forces occupied most of Manchuria. Even though China and Russia agreed to divide the island, they each continue to claim that they are entitled to full sovereignty over the island.

<sup>59</sup>Patrick Tucker, "Hegseth: Pentagon Must Return to Long-Term Planning against Strategic Adversaries," February 9, 2025, <https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/02/hegseth-defense-department-must-return-long-term-planning-against-strategic-adversaries/402858/?oref=d1-featured-river-top>.

<sup>60</sup> U.S. Global Development Lab, <https://web.archive.org/web/20240926185919/https://2012-2017.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/bureaus/us-global-development-lab>. This is an archived version as the USAID website is no longer publicly available in violation of H.R.3766 - Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 <https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/3766/text>.

mechanisms such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, a global effort to stop illegal arms trafficking.

*Work with Allies to Combat Cyberthreats.* The US and allies have successfully collaborated to protect Ukraine from Chinese and Russian cyberthreats through the Tallinn Mechanism.<sup>61</sup> This type of cooperation could be a model for efforts elsewhere to protect vulnerable partners.

*Support US Coast Guard Cooperation with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to counter illegal arms transfers between Iran and Russia.* Congress should support continued funding for these programs by USCENTCOM and EUCOM to help partner countries respond to weapons proliferation, terrorism, and other maritime threats to the Caspian Sea. Greater engagement with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan more broadly works to reduce Russian, Chinese, and Iranian influence in these countries. The Caspian Initiative was active in the early 2000s and should be restarted to monitor and interdict illegal arms transfers across the Caspian Sea.<sup>62</sup>

---

<sup>61</sup> Alexander Martin, “Ukraine's Partners Launch Tallinn Mechanism to Amplify Cyber Support,” December 20, 2023,


<https://therecord.media/tallinn-mechanism-ukraine-partners-cybersecurity>.

<sup>62</sup> *Land-Locked Naval Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea*, Caspian Policy Center, May 2022,

[https://api.caspianpolicy.org/media/ckeditor\\_media/2022/05/12/land-locked-naval-defense-diplomacy-in-the-caspian-sea.pdf](https://api.caspianpolicy.org/media/ckeditor_media/2022/05/12/land-locked-naval-defense-diplomacy-in-the-caspian-sea.pdf).

# Appendix 1 Sino-Russian Territorial Boundaries in History

## MANCHURIA-U.S.S.R BOUNDARY



60 440



*Appendix 2: Heixiazi (Bolshoi Ussuriiskii) Island*

