



Hearing on “Made in China 2025—Who Is Winning?”

February 6, 2025

Opening Statement of Vice Chair Randall Schriver

Thank you Commissioner Kuiken. First, let me join you in welcoming our witnesses and thanking them for participating in the hearing.

Made in China 2025 was an audacious project. It also involved policies that were clearly a violation of China’s global trade commitments. The successes of Made in China 2025 underline the importance for Congress, the U.S. government, and really all of China’s trading partners to take seriously the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) stated ambitions in technology and supply chains.

The experience of the past ten years demonstrates the immensity of the resources Chinese leaders are willing to deploy toward these objectives. And, there is little reason to suspect the China’s interventionist approach will lessen over the next decade. The CCP aims to make China a leader in technological innovation and manufacturing key industries of the future. These policies are not just to achieve domestic growth and self-sufficiency; they are designed to ensure dominance and global dependency on China.

Concerns about Made in China 2025 and related policies are most acute when it comes to technologies that augment China’s military modernization. As our witnesses will testify, China pursues numerous, overlapping policies in support of its goals, ranging from subsidies to various technology transfer policies to outright theft. However, the integration of civilian technological development with military innovation through military-civil fusion means that these industrial policies must be viewed in the context of Xi Jinping’s goal to acquire a “world-class military.” From autonomous technologies, such as drone swarming, to the development of new materials for aerospace applications, Chinese leaders have linked becoming an innovative nation with gaining a battlefield advantage.

Clearly, the United States and allied countries need to be more proactive to ensure that China cannot dominate more industries like it has done in electric vehicles and solar panels. While the United States did wake up to the problem and begin more aggressive use of export controls and other trade tools, those came very late in the process. China’s advances in critical technologies like semiconductor manufacturing and artificial intelligence are reminders to the U.S. and like-minded countries of the need for quick and decisive action. The stakes are too high.

Competition for leadership for certain technologies like genetic engineering or human-like artificial general intelligence is fierce. In many cases, the first country who can deploy these technologies will see a significant advantage across multiple domains of commercial and military competition. The witnesses on our panel looking ahead to the next decade of U.S.-China competition have been asked to answer several important questions. Perhaps the most important is this: Does the nature of this technological competition, and the potential security implications of key technologies, mean that United States must develop new measures to boost our capabilities and prevent leakage to China or can the United States rely on the strength of its innovation ecosystem to run faster than China?

I look forward to the discussion today and learning from the expertise of our witnesses.